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Authoring Prior Art
Joseph P. Fishman *
Kristelia García **
Patent law and copyright law are widely understood to diverge in how
they approach prior art, the universe of information that already existed before
a particular innovation’s development. For patents, prior art is paramount. An
invention can’t be patented unless it is both novel and nonobvious when viewed
against the backdrop of all the earlier inventions that paved the way. But for
copyrights, prior art is supposed to be virtually irrelevant. Black-letter copyright
doctrine doesn’t care if a creative work happens to resemble its predecessors,
only that it isn’t actually copied from them. In principle, then, outside of the
narrow question of whether someone might have drawn from a preexisting
third-party source, copyright infringement disputes would seem to have little
doctrinal use for prior art.
But that principle turns out to be missing a big part of what’s actually
going on in copyright litigation today. In this Article, we identify a surprising
trend: parties in cases involving music are increasingly discussing anticipatory
earlier works, and judges are increasingly holding it against them if they don’t.
The concept of prior art, once for inventors only, is now for authors, too.
A major cause for this change, we argue, is the influence of a small cadre
of expert witnesses. We interviewed several of the most active experts in music
copyright disputes, and we analyzed dozens of reports that they have filed over
the last two decades. Our data revealed a group that has been focused on
authorial prior art since well before the courts were. These experts’ professional
self-understanding, moreover, diverges sharply from the traditionally limited
role that experts are supposed to play in evaluating copyright infringement.
They view prior art research as a major part of their job. And for many of them,
that research is important not just because it can sift between copying and
*
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** Associate Professor of Law at the University of Colorado Law School, and Director of the
Intellectual Property Initiative at the Silicon Flatirons Center for Law, Technology and
Entrepreneurship. For helpful comments and conversations, we thank Ed Cheng, Charles Duan,
Mark Lemley, Peter Menell, Pam Samuelson, Sean Seymore, and Steve Yelderman, along with
participants in the 2021 Copyright Scholars Roundtable. Special thanks as well to Sloane Dreyer,
Christopher Mignacca, Ty Trejo, and the research librarians at Colorado and Vanderbilt Law
Schools for their outstanding research assistance. While we’ve drawn extensively from the prior
art of other authors, any errors are original to us.
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independent creation, but also because it informs their normative view of what
expression deserves legal exclusivity in the first place. Because of this expert
community, prior art isn’t just for patents anymore.
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INTRODUCTION
At the core of the patent system is the concept of “prior art,” the
universe of information that already existed before a particular
innovation’s development. An invention doesn’t merit a patent unless
it’s sufficiently different from what society already knows. 1 The prior
art, which defines the scope of that knowledge, sets the baseline against
which patentability questions are measured. 2
Elsewhere within the world of intellectual property (“IP”), by
contrast, the notion of prior art is supposedly irrelevant. In copyright,
the body of law that confers rights over authorial expression rather
than technological invention, black-letter doctrine doesn’t care if a
creative work happens to resemble some of its predecessors. 3 Any such
1.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (requiring that inventions be novel and nonobvious to be eligible
for a patent).
2.
See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Prior Art and Possession, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV.
123, 134 (2018).
3.
See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–46 (1991).
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overlap is fine just so long as it resulted coincidentally from
independent creation, not from outright copying. In principle, then,
outside of the narrow question of whether someone might have directly
drawn from a preexisting source, the notion of prior art should have no
work to do in copyright. 4 As a result, in a leading treatise’s words, “the
search for prior art that frequently goes into challenging a patent does
not form an inherent part of adjudicating copyright cases.” 5
Indeed, using the term in copyright discussions is a surefire way
to brand yourself a doctrinal out-of-towner. On social media, IP experts
“recoil” if they encounter such slippage and declare it “wrong” and
“crazy.” 6 Prior art, it’s reasonably insisted, “is not a thing for
copyright.” 7 Likewise, treatise authors scold copyright defendants who
try to surround the plaintiff’s work with prior art in an effort to
minimize its creativity 8—to say nothing of any judge who is careless
enough to let them do it. 9
Yet however much commentators may try to keep prior art in
the patent lane, it’s not staying there. In this Article, we identify a
surprising trend: parties in cases involving music are increasingly
4.
See, e.g., Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 610 (1st Cir.
1988) (holding that evidence of similar expression in works that predated the plaintiff’s’ work could
be relevant only for evaluating whether the plaintiff or defendant had actually copied something
from those works, and that absent any such defense the evidence had therefore been “wholly
irrelevant”); BMS Ent./Heat Music LLC v. Bridges, No. 04 CIV. 2584, 2005 WL 1593013, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2005) (rejecting a defendant’s argument concerning similar expression in earlier
works because “[t]he concept of originality in copyright law is fundamentally different from
concepts of anticipation and novelty in patent law”).
5.
See 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01[A][2] (2021
ed.); see also PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 1.14.2.2[C] (2021) (“Copyright law’s
relatively low standard for protection and its relatively high standard for infringement make it
unnecessary for authors and publishers to conduct costly and often fruitless prior art searches.”);
Sylvia Ngo, Egyptian Goddess v. Swisa: Patently Obvious? Reconciling the Ordinary Observer and
Point of Novelty Tests, 10 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 110, 128 (2010) (commenting that copyright’s
substantial similarity standard for infringement “surveys the entire view of a product as compared
to another without regard to prior art”).
(May
12,
2020,
3:51
PM),
6.
Pamela
Chestek
(@pchestek),
TWITTER
https://twitter.com/pchestek/status/1260326833792397320 [https://perma.cc/9XYY-F5BW] (“Oh,
this makes me recoil—‘prior art’ for copyrights, as in your registration will be invalid if there is
‘prior art’ . . . .”); Sharon K. Sandeen, Reply, FACEBOOK (May 27, 2020, 9:15 PM) (on file with
author) (“This is the second time in two days that I have seen copyright and prior art used in the
same sentence in judicial opinions. STOP. WRONG. CRAZY.”).
(Sept.
1,
2018,
8:08
AM),
7.
Charles
Duan
(@charles_duan),
TWITTER
https://twitter.com/charles_duan/status/1035876966942105600 [https://perma.cc/X3TR-EXYU].
8.
See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 5, § 8.01[C] (“[T]he common practice of defendants
at trial in pointing out a similar work created in antiquity, or at least prior to defendant’s creation,
is of no assistance unless the trier of fact believes that defendant copied from that prior work.”).
9.
3 THOMAS D. SELZ, MELVIN SIMENSKY, PATRICIA ACTON & ROBERT LIND, ENTERTAINMENT
LAW 3D: LEGAL CONCEPTS AND BUSINESS PRACTICES § 16:13.50 (2020) (criticizing any such judicial
decisions as aberrations that “undermine[ ] the basic premise of copyright law that two authors
can each create a protected work, if neither copied from the other”).
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discussing anticipatory earlier works, and judges are increasingly
holding it against them if they don’t. Take, for example, the 2020 case
that dismissed an infringement claim for “fail[ing] to consider prior art,”
rendering the plaintiff’s comparison of the parties’ two works “legally
deficient and irrelevant.” 10 Or take another case from the same year
that dismissed a claim for want of “any information about prior art,” 11
after the defendant had introduced three songs that overlapped with
the allegedly copied expression.
These cases, along with many others we discuss here, aren’t
primarily about whether the defendant actually copied something from
the owner—the only question for which earlier works are supposed to
be relevant. They’re about whether any copying mattered. Courts are
using prior art, in other words, to assess the normative substantiality
of any similarities they find. However much that analysis conflicts with
traditional doctrine, in music infringement cases it’s becoming
remarkably common. The concept of prior art, once for inventors only,
is now for authors, too.
A major cause for this change, we argue, is the influence of a
small cadre of expert witnesses. We interviewed several of the most
active experts in music copyright disputes, and we analyzed dozens of
reports that they have filed over the last two decades. Our data revealed
a group that has been focused on authorial prior art since well before
the courts were. These experts’ professional self-understanding,
moreover, diverges sharply from the traditionally limited role that
experts are supposed to play in evaluating copyright infringement.
They view prior art research as a major part of their job. And for many
of them, that research is important not just because it can sift between
copying and independent creation, but also because it informs their
normative view of what expression deserves legal exclusivity in the first
place.
Through their written reports, expert witnesses have been
invoking the concept of authorial prior art for at least the past two
decades. Only in the last few years, however, have some judges begun
to adopt the concept in their opinions. In the intervening time period,
experts have been quietly functioning as what the law-and-social-norms
literature might call norm entrepreneurs, working to influence
decisionmakers’ opinions on which kinds of copying are proper or
improper. 12
10. Johannsongs-Publ’g Ltd. v. Lovland, Case No. CV 18-10009, 2020 WL 2315805, at *5
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2020).
11. Smith v. The Weeknd, No. CV 19-2507, 2020 WL 4932074, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2020).
12. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909
(1996) (coining the term “norm entrepreneurs” to identify individuals who work to change existing
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If experts have been saying the same thing for so long, why have
courts only just recently begun to voice their acceptance? The evidence
we present here doesn’t answer that question. But we suspect it may
have something to do with recent doctrinal changes within copyright
law in general and music copyright in particular. As we discuss below,
the Supreme Court’s elimination of the laches defense in copyright
cases has made it easier to sue downstream creators over works that
they created and commercialized decades ago. And since 2015’s
phenomenally high-profile jury verdict finding that the hit song
“Blurred Lines” infringed Marvin Gaye’s “Got to Give It Up,” there’s
been a pervasive narrative among commentators that it’s getting too
easy to find liability for musical similarity between songs. 13 When a
federal appeals court affirmed that verdict, the dissenting judge warned
that the copyright owner had effectively “copyright[ed] a musical style,”
establishing “a dangerous precedent that strikes a devastating blow to
future musicians and composers everywhere.” 14 It wouldn’t surprise us
if developments like those are encouraging judges to consider prior art
more frequently in copyright cases. 15
Whatever other factors might be at play, we don’t claim to curate
all of them here. Our descriptive goal is to show the growth of a prior
art doctrine within copyright law and to highlight forensic experts’ role
in fueling that growth. This small group probably isn’t the only cause.
But it has been an influential—and, to legal scholars, largely
unexamined—agent of change behind the emerging reality that prior
art isn’t just for patents anymore.
Finally, we note here at the outset that while the notion of expert
witnesses convincing judges to alter the substantive content of law
might sound ominous, we think that in this context it’s probably a good
thing. The substantial similarity standard for infringement, a concept
that appears nowhere in the Copyright Act, has always been developed
by judges through common-law evolution. 16 If judges are exercising that
social norms); Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 13–16
(2001) (distinguishing norm entrepreneurs from other opinion leaders).
13. See, e.g., Amy X. Wang, How Music Copyright Lawsuits Are Scaring Away New Hits,
ROLLING STONE (Jan. 9, 2020, 2:08 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/pro/features/musiccopyright-lawsuits-chilling-effect-935310/ [https://perma.cc/2WMA-BFM3] (reporting that due to a
“boom in copyright lawsuits . . . the once-sleepy realm of music copyright law has turned into a
minefield”).
14. Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1138 (9th Cir. 2018) (Nguyen, J., dissenting).
15. We discuss these changes below at Part III.B.
16. See Jessica Litman, Silent Similarity, 14 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 11, 16 (2014) (noting
that “[i]n the first third of the century, courts and lawyers articulated much of the doctrine that
21st century scholars see as intrinsic to copyright and firmly cemented in copyright’s core.”); Peter
S. Menell, The Mixed Heritage of Federal Intellectual Property Law and Ramifications for
Statutory Interpretation, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 63, 63
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traditional common-law role in a way that’s informed by experts whose
arguments they find persuasive, we see nothing wrong with it. And, as
we explain in this Article’s conclusion, on the merits there’s a lot that’s
right with it. Considering prior art allows judges to understand a work
in its creative context rather than in a vacuum. It also provides those
judges a tool that can help dispose of cases on summary judgment,
generating a jurisprudence that can guide future actors in a way that
black-box jury verdicts simply cannot. Given the baseline that copyright
doctrine has already set for how broadly substantial similarity can be
defined, we see greater consideration of authorial prior art by judges as
a healthy development.
Part I begins with a review of prior art’s central role in patent
law and what used to be its virtually nonexistent role in copyright law.
We show, however, that the concept has become increasingly central in
judicial opinions on music infringement over the past two decades. In
Part II, we move from the ultimate legal decisions to a close study of
the expert witnesses who, we argue, are most responsible for causing
this doctrinal shift. We make this argument drawing from both our
interview data and experts’ written reports that have been filed in
litigated cases. Part III offers some possible theories as to why expert
witnesses in music cases have converged around prior art—and taken
courts along with them—despite decades of doctrine seemingly placing
that approach off limits. Finally, a concluding section explains how our
findings on the emergence of authorial prior art suggests both some
immediate tactical lessons for practitioners as well as deeper structural
reforms regarding the role of the expert in copyright litigation.
I. THE CONCEPT OF PRIOR ART
Copyrights and patents are each supposed to promote
innovation through the grant of their own form of exclusivity. 17
Copyrights cover works of authorship like books, music, and movies,
while patents cover functional inventions like pharmaceuticals,
smartphone components, and manufacturing methods. The same
constitutional clause empowers Congress to legislate in both spheres in

(Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013) (discussing the standards for patent and copyright
infringement and concluding that “the judiciary’s imprint and evolving role are unmistakable and
profound”).
17. See, e.g., Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d
206, 216 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that both the copyright and patent systems “seek to encourage
innovation”); Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual
Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 846 (2006) (“The law grants patents to inventors and
copyrights to authors to encourage investments in technological and cultural innovation.”).
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order to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” 18 The
rationale that most U.S. commentators give for that power lies in the
likelihood that informational goods, whether expressive or functional,
would be undersupplied if imitators could easily enter the market and
undercut the originator’s prices without having to bear the same fixed
costs of creation. 19 A patent’s or copyright’s exclusivity thus offers an
appropriability mechanism that could encourage investment in creative
activity that might not otherwise occur.
But society ends up paying for that exclusivity. For consumers,
the existence of IP rights can raise prices in the marketplace. And for
downstream creators, it can complicate efforts to build on the protected
product and develop a new one. As a matter of policy, then, it might be
reasonable to limit protection to products that are genuinely new. If the
ostensible innovator gives us something that we already have, after all,
why incur all those social costs?
A. Prior Art in Patent Law
Unsurprisingly, patent law doesn’t ask us to incur them. Ever
since the nation’s first Patent Act, which offered protection only to
contributions that were “not before known or used,” 20 the law has
required an invention to be novel in order to be patentable. In the
Supreme Court’s early encapsulation: “To entitle a man to a patent, the
invention must be new to the world.” 21 Congress formally codified this
novelty element in 1836, requiring any protectable invention to be, in a
word, “new.” 22 That element remains codified today in sections 101 and
102 of the current Patent Act. 23
Not only must an invention be new, but it must also be
unconventional in some way. Even an entirely novel invention will be
denied a patent if the differences between it and what came before
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The
economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is
the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance
public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’ ”).
19. E.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75
TEX. L. REV. 989, 994 (1997); SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES (2004).
20. Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109, 110.
21. Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 20 (1829) (emphasis omitted). An even earlier case
explained that “if the thing was not originally discovered by the patentee, but had been in use, or
had been described in some public work, anterior to the supposed discovery of the patentee, . . . the
patent [shall be] declared void.” Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454, 514 (1818) (emphasis
omitted).
22. Patent Act of 1836, 5 Stat. 117, 118.
23. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (requiring that an invention be “new” in order to be patentable); id. § 102
(outlining specific conditions for satisfying this novelty requirement).
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“would have been obvious . . . to a person having ordinary skill in the
art to which the claimed invention pertains.” 24 In practice, according to
the Court’s most recent exploration of the standard in KSR
International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., some activity may be creative but
would nevertheless fall within the statute’s “ordinary skill” zone. 25 “A
person of ordinary skill,” the Court said, “is also a person of ordinary
creativity, not an automaton.” 26
Of course, in order to assess whether an informational good is
truly new and nonobvious, one first needs to know about what
information society already has. Since the late nineteenth century, the
U.S. patent system has called that universe of information the “prior
art.” So far as we’ve been able to determine, the first legal usage of that
term in the United States came in an obscure 1885 infringement
decision, McFarland v. Deere & Mansur Manufacturing Co. 27 A few
years later, and almost certainly more significantly, William Robinson’s
influential treatise adopted the term. 28 Beginning in the last few years
of the nineteenth century, judges began using “prior art” in the same
sense that modern patent practitioners would immediately recognize. 29
Following a series of Supreme Court nonobviousness decisions
that continued to emphasize “prior art” in the 1930s and 1940s, 30
24. Id. § 103. Though now statutory, this nonobviousness element was originally judge-made.
See Joseph P. Fishman, Originality’s Other Path, 109 CALIF. L. REV. 861, 868 (2021) (reviewing the
growth of the nonobviousness doctrine in the second half of the nineteenth century).
25. 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007).
26. Id. at 421; see also id. at 420 (“[I]n many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit
the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.”).
27. 22 F. 781, 783 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1885) (assessing an attempt to invalidate a patent for lack of
novelty by “look[ing] back into the prior art”). According to the West database, no subsequent
authority has yet cited the case.
28. E.g., 3 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 263 (1890)
(“The identity of the prior art or article with the patented invention may be established by any
kind of relevant testimony.”); id. at 267 (describing evidence that could convince a jury “that the
prior art or article was identical with the patented invention”). Robinson’s addition of the “or
article” language suggests that he was using “art” to refer to earlier published disclosures
specifically, as distinguished from earlier physical embodiments that had been publicly exploited.
29. See, e.g., Knapp v. Morss, 150 U.S. 221, 224 (1893) (“In determining the proper
construction to be placed upon [a patent’s claim], it is necessary to consider the action of the patent
office upon the original application of the patentee, and also examine the prior art.”); Duer v.
Corbin Cabinet Lock Co., 149 U.S. 216, 221 (1893) (identifying “features of improvement not
disclosed by the prior art”); Gates Iron Works v. Fraser, 153 U.S. 332, 348 (1894) (referring to a
patent claim that had been granted because it “was an improvement on anything contained in the
prior art”); see also Determining the Validity of A Patent on Demurrer to A Bill in Equity, 5 YALE
L.J. 213, 215 (1896) (“In the trial of patent cases usually the most important element in passing
on the validity of a patent is what is known as the state of the prior art; which is proof of what is
old and in general use at the date of the invention.”).
30. See, e.g., Altoona Publix Theatres v. Am. Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 477, 486 (1935)
(holding that an improvement on existing technology is not patentable if it is the “mere exercise of
the skill of the calling or an advance plainly indicated by the prior art”); Cuno Eng’g Corp. v.
Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 88 (1941) (same).
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Congress included the term as part of the new Patent Act in 1952. That
Act’s nonobviousness standard, still persisting today under 2011’s most
recent revision of the statute, withholds protection “if the differences
between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the
claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious.” 31 This provision
requires fact finders assessing an invention’s nonobviousness to, in the
Court’s words, determine “the scope and content of the prior art” as well
as the “differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.” 32
More recently, the Federal Circuit has explained that “the real meaning
of ‘prior art’ in legal theory . . . is knowledge that is available, including
what would be obvious from it, at a given time, to a person of ordinary
skill in an art. Society, speaking through Congress and the courts, has
said ‘thou shalt not take it away.’ ” 33 Differentiation from the prior art
thus stands as a central element of patentability for literally every
invention. 34
B. Prior Art in Copyright Law
Now contrast that approach with copyright law’s. Traditionally,
copyright doctrine is perfectly content to hand out protection to a work
that overlaps with earlier ones, just so long as that overlap was
coincidental. If two works are created independently of one another,
each can receive its own copyright regardless of how similar they are—
and the later one does not infringe the earlier. 35 The work need only be
original to its particular author, not necessarily new to the world.
“Originality,” the Supreme Court has stressed, “does not signify
novelty; a work may be original even though it closely resembles other
works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of
copying. . . . [A]ssume that two poets, each ignorant of the other,
31. 35 U.S.C. § 103; see also H.R. REP. NO. 1923, at 7 (1952) (“Section 103 . . . refers to the
difference between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art, meaning what was
known before as described in section 102.”).
32. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
33. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453–54 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
34. See Holbrook, supra note 2, at 134 (arguing that “[d]efining what constitutes ‘prior art’ is
a critical aspect of the gatekeeping function performed by the USPTO and the federal courts,
ensuring that patents are awarded for only merit-worthy inventions” and that prior art provides
the basis of every novelty and nonobviousness determination because “the invention must be
compared to what came before it”).
35. See, e.g., Mag Jewelry Co. v. Cherokee, Inc., 496 F.3d 108, 116 (1st Cir. 2007) (relying on
the Nimmer treatise for the proposition that “a work is original and may command copyright
protection, even if it is completely identical with a prior work, provided it was not copied from such
prior work but is rather a product of the independent efforts of its author”); Boisson v. Banian Ltd.,
273 F.3d 262, 270 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Absent evidence of copying, an author is entitled to copyright
protection for an independently produced original work despite its identical nature to a prior work,
because it is independent creation, and not novelty that is required.”)
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compose identical poems. Neither work is novel, yet both are original
and . . . copyrightable. 36" The most famous application of this principle
belongs to Learned Hand, who in 1936 famously quipped, “[I]f by some
magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats’s
Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an ‘author,’ and, if he copyrighted
it, others might not copy that poem, though they might of course copy
Keats’s.” 37
Over the years, commentators have offered a number of theories
to explain this difference in copyright’s and patent’s tolerance for
repetition. Clarisa Long, for example, points to copyright’s high
information costs, arguing that it would be too burdensome to expect
creators to sift through the entirety of copyrighted expression. 38 Paul
Goldstein argues that the difference can be explained by what he
perceives to be different outputs that each system is trying to stimulate:
copyright seeks to encourage abundant information on the one hand,
while patent law seeks to encourage efficient information on the other. 39
Jeanne Fromer has offered a supply-side theory rooted in the
psychology of artistic creativity. 40 Because audiences value creative
problem-finding in the arts and not just problem-solving, she argues,
copyright rewards authors for their subjective expression regardless of
whether that expression objectively resembles another’s. 41
Whatever the rationale, it would seem that the concept of prior
art should have little relevance to copyright as a doctrinal matter. The
only uncontroversial exception would be if the defendant were using it
to challenge whether copying had in fact occurred. That sort of
challenge could come in two forms, one focused on the author’s creative
process and the other on the accused infringer’s. First, since originality
requires independent creation, a defendant might introduce prior art in
order to argue that the putative author had actually derived the
relevant expression from earlier sources. Second, because one cannot be
liable for copyright infringement without actually copying from the
36. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–46 (1991); see also Selle v.
Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 901 (1984) (“[T]wo works may be identical in every detail, but, if the alleged
infringer created the accused work independently or both works were copied from a common source
in the public domain, then there is no infringement.”).
37. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936).
38. Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 529–33
(2004); see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law,
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 345–46 (1989) (arguing that copyright’s independent creation defense is in
part a function of how hard it is to search through the universe of copyrighted works).
39. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 2.2.1.1.
40. Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1492–
93 (2010).
41. Id. at 1493.
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plaintiff’s work, a defendant might also introduce prior art in order to
show that the similarity at issue was merely coincidental. 42 Maybe
similarities in earlier works strengthen the probability of independent
creation by suggesting that the allegedly copied expression is the sort
of thing that artists working separately from each other will all
naturally gravitate toward. Or maybe they support an inference that
the defendant had copied not from the plaintiff but from an unrelated
third party who happened to have written the same thing.
In circumstances where there’s a legitimate concern that the
accused copyist has independently created or that the author has not,
we’d of course want to know what works had already come before. But
those concerns are rarely implicated. In copyright’s grand scheme of
things, validity seldom falters on an imposturous author’s clandestine
copying. 43 Infringement liability likewise seldom falters on mislabeling
an act of coincidental re-creation as an act of copying. 44 Authors simply
don’t converge around identical literary expression anywhere near as
often as inventors converge around identical solutions to technological
problems.
Given that rarity, we should expect prior art to come up only
infrequently in copyright cases. As Paul Goldstein summarizes in his
copyright treatise, the independent creation doctrine renders it
“unnecessary for authors and publishers to conduct costly and often
fruitless prior art searches” and “assure[s] them protection for their
works—and freedom from liability for infringing copyright in the works
of others—so long as they do not copy from other works.” 45
Yet as the remainder of this Part shows, in a growing number of
cases copyright prior art searches may no longer be so unnecessary after
42. See Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111,1117 (9th Cir. 2018).
43. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX.
L. REV. 1, 9 (2007) (arguing that “claims of true independent duplication are much more rare” for
copyrightable works than they are for patentable inventions and that copyright policy can afford
to grant protection over similar but independently created works, despite the social inefficiency of
redundant output, because “independently created copyrighted works are so unlikely to be
identical that the problem of wasteful duplication is negligible”).
44. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Method and Madness in Copyright Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 587,
599–600 (2007) (“[I]ndependent re-creation is a defense to a claim of copyright infringement. But
we assume both as a matter of evidence and as a matter of causality that the chances of
independently re-creating a Picasso painting or a Moby soundtrack, or Keats’ Ode on a Grecian
Urn, are vanishingly small.”); Clark D. Asay, Independent Creation in a World of AI, 14 FIU L.
REV. 201, 211 (2020):
[I]n many copyright contexts, independent creation is simply an impossibility, such that
the defense rarely if ever plays an important role in limiting copyright. And while in
other contexts we may often point to independent creation as playing a role in allowing
parties to develop similar works, typically the idea-expression, scenes a faire, and
merger doctrines do much of the actual work in limiting copyright protections.
45. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, § 1.14.2.2[C].
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all. In spite of its black-letter irrelevance, prior art has provided the
basis for many challenges to a copyrighted work’s originality over the
last century. For almost all of that time, as we discuss below in Section
I.B.1, those challenges all failed. But over the last two decades, multiple
copyright cases involving musical similarity have assessed the
protectability of a plaintiff’s expression by focusing patent-style on
whether that expression had been anticipated in the corpus of earlier
works.
We survey this modern case law in Section I.B.2. We find that,
like patent law, these cases are surprisingly willing to reject an
infringement accusation if the plaintiff’s material turns out to resemble
earlier contributions, regardless of whether the plaintiff was ever
actually aware of them. Indeed, many decisions expressly refer to those
contributions as “the prior art.” The key analytical move in these cases
is that prior art can weaken the plaintiff’s claim even if the plaintiff had
come up with its overlapping material entirely independently. The mere
existence of the earlier works is enough to make the defendant’s alleged
appropriation unactionable.
In two important respects, however, this nascent concept of
authorial prior art differs from patent law’s version. First, unlike in
patent challenges, the copyright cases aren’t invoking prior art in order
to invalidate the entitlement altogether. Instead, they’re doing it in
order to modulate the substantiality of the similarity between parties’
works: a similarity is more substantial if the author’s expression is
genuinely novel, and less substantial if the author’s expression turns
out to have been done before. Second, patent law follows a one-and-done
model in which a single prior-art reference can preclude protection. 46 In
these copyright cases, by contrast, magnitude matters. The copyright
version seems to depend on finding some unstated number of earlier
works, rather than just flipping on a switch by finding a single one.
Before we get there, though, we ought to explain how the
reasoning that we’re tracking in these cases differs from another staple
copyright doctrine known as “scènes à faire.” 47 That judge-made
46. Patentability doctrines do not especially care whether there is a lot of prior art or a little,
just so long as the relevant information can be found somewhere within it. A claimed invention
will fail the novelty requirement if all of its elements are already contained in a single prior-art
reference, no matter how obscure. See, e.g., In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 900 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding
that an applicant’s invention was anticipated, and therefore unpatentable, based solely on one
doctoral thesis in a German university library). Similarly, while the nonobviousness standard will
typically survey multiple references to see if their combined teachings would predictably lead to
the claimed invention, it assigns no greater weight if many of those references say the same thing.
47. Judge Leon Yankwich coined the term for copyright purposes in Cain v. Universal
Pictures Co., 47 F. Supp. 1013, 1017 (S.D. Cal. 1942). He wrote that plot elements that were
“inherent in the situation itself,” or “what the French call ‘scenes a faire,’ ” would “necessarily [be]
associated with such a situation,” and that “such similarities and incidental details necessary to
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limitation on copyright scope teaches that “a copyright owner can’t
prove infringement by pointing to features of his work that are found in
the defendant’s work as well but that are so rudimentary,
commonplace, standard, or unavoidable that they do not serve to
distinguish one work within a class of works from another.” 48 To the
extent that the defendants in the cases below are trying to invoke
earlier works in order to prove commonality, one might reasonably
guess that they’re ultimately arguing a version of scènes à faire,
whether they call it that or not. 49
We think, however, that here again there are two significant
differences between that doctrine and the reliance on prior art that we
discuss here. First, scènes à faire is meant to apply only where the
allegedly copied expression has truly become standardized (think shootouts outside a saloon in a Western film). By contrast, many of the prior
art arguments discussed here don’t depend on a theory of
standardization; instead, they’re content to show that the expression
has simply appeared enough times to be unextraordinary. 50
Second, according to several decisions, scènes à faire is supposed
to be specific to a work’s genre, not a freeform search for anticipatory
materials lurking anywhere they might be found. 51 The Ninth Circuit,
for example, rejected a scènes à faire defense in a music infringement
case where the songs were “not in the same relevant ‘field’ of music.” 52
Categorizing the plaintiff’s work within a “hip-hop/R & B genre” and
the proffered third-party work within the “folk music genre,” the court
concluded that comparing one with the other was unhelpful because it
didn’t answer whether the allegedly similar elements were “an
indispensable idea” specifically within the genre in which the author
was working.
Thus, as Bob Clarida recently put it, scènes à faire “is not a
novelty standard, this is not saying ‘has anything ever had this element
the environment or setting of an action are not the material of which copyrightable originality
consists.” Id.
48. Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2003).
49. Cf. Dale Cendali, Litigating Scènes à Faire, 43 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 415, 417 (2020) (noting
that “expert witnesses are so important in trying to establish scènes à faire” because they “could
help provide more information as to what is truly common”).
50. See, e.g., Smith v. The Weeknd, No. CV 19-2507, 2020 WL 4932074, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July
22, 2020) (dismissing an infringement claim based on only three works in the prior art).
51. See Gable v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 727 F. Supp. 2d 815, 837–38 (C.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d, 438 F.
App’x 587 (9th Cir. 2011):
[C]omparisons to prior art are only helpful to the extent that they are genrespecific. . . . [I]t is not helpful to simply point out that certain past works also included
a particular element; rather, to demonstrate that the element is not protectable, it must
be shown that such an element is standard or indispensable in [that genre].
52. Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F. 3d 841, 850 (9th Cir. 2004).
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in it’—but another work in the genre, that’s really the relevant
question.” 53 As we’ll see, though, the prior art arguments that we track
here are pretty much asking exactly that first, forbidden question:
whether anything ever had the relevant element in it. The identification
of, say, a twelve-bar-blues chord progression in a Romantic-period piano
sonata should not be able to support a scènes à faire argument since
that progression is not commonplace in that genre. It could, by contrast,
qualify as prior art that helps weaken the substantiality of an alleged
similarity between the parties’ works.
1. Early Case Law
The first usage of the term “prior art” in a reported copyright
case occurred in an otherwise unremarkable 1929 decision over
decorative shoebox labels. In Hoague-Sprague Corp. v. Frank C. Meyer
Co., the court concluded that the author’s label design was sufficiently
original notwithstanding the many “anticipations” that the defendant
had highlighted. 54 It reasoned that the defendant’s evidence didn’t
matter because the plaintiff’s work was “not a copy of any of the prior
art offered in evidence, and the originality required in case of copyright
means little more than a prohibition of actual copying.” 55 While the
terminology might displease copyright purists, the proposition should
look substantively familiar to modern practitioners: we care about
earlier works in copyright cases only for purposes of identifying actual
copying.
Over the next decade, defendants in several cases repeated the
same strategy without much success. One example comes from one of
the most famous copyright decisions in U.S. history, Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp. 56 The plaintiff, a playwright who created a
massively popular Broadway play, accused a Hollywood studio of
making a nonliterally infringing film. Judge Learned Hand authored
the appellate decision rejecting her claim. That decision has become a
law school casebook staple primarily for its discussion of the distinction
53. Robert W. Clarida, Making Sense of Scènes à Faire Through the Lens of Feist, 43 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 419, 420 (2020); see also id. at 422 (observing that the doctrine “seems to say that an
element can be protectable if it’s used in a work in this genre, but not if it’s used in a work in that
genre”); Robert Kirk Walker, Breaking with Convention: The Conceptual Failings of Scènes à Faire,
38 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 435, 456, 458 (2020) (“When courts ask what incident, characters,
or settings are practically ‘indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a given topic,’
they are implicitly asking: To what genre does this work belong? . . . [E]valuating scènes à
faire mainly comes down to understanding genre conventions . . . .”).
54. 31 F.2d 583, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1929).
55. Id.
56. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
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between protectable expression and unprotectable ideas. But the
defendant didn’t chiefly rely on any such distinction in litigating the
case. Instead, it argued extensively that any similarities between the
two works had already been anticipated in over seventy different works,
which it repeatedly and conspicuously labeled “the prior art”
throughout its appellate brief. 57 The plaintiff, for her part, offered a
witness at trial who testified as “an expert on the prior art” that the
work in suit was full of elements not previously found in “any play or
structure in literature.” 58
That argument failed to impress the trial judge, who dismissed
the claim after finding that the thematic similarities were “not new”
and thus “common property.” 59 On appeal, the plaintiff faulted the
defendant for bringing a patent to a copyright fight. It’s no defense
against an independent creator, she argued, to invoke “prior art and/or
public domain, unless the alleged infringer is able to connect himself
with prior art and/or public domain as the source from which he derived
the alleged infringing work.” 60 The prior art might very well be “open to
all who tread it,” but it should not be “a defense to those who invade the
closes of others, however similar to prior art and/or public domain.” 61
The plaintiff may have been right about that, but she lost the
appeal anyway. The Second Circuit held that, regardless of what earlier
material the author might have previously been aware of, she was
impermissibly trying to extend copyright protection over ideas and
stock themes. 62 The alleged similarities with the defendant’s film were
simply too abstract to merit protection. The battle over prior art that
occupied so much attention at trial and during the appeal received only
the faintest gesture in the court’s opinion, which was willing to concede
“that the plaintiff’s play was wholly original” and “that novelty is not
essential to a copyright.” 63 Still, it concluded, “there is no monopoly in
such a background. Though the plaintiff discovered the vein, she could
not keep it to herself; so defined, the theme was too generalized an
abstraction from what she wrote. It was only a part of her ‘ideas.’ ” 64

57. See Brief for Appellee at 82–83, Nichols, 45 F.2d 119 [hereinafter Nichols Appellee Brief].
As Jessica Litman notes in her close reading of the Nichols case file, the defendant “directed major
efforts to finding as many works as possible that resembled” the plaintiff’s play. Litman, supra
note 16, at 34.
58. Nichols Appellee Brief, supra note 57, at 82 (citing trial record).
59. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 34 F.2d 145, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
60. Brief on Behalf of Appellant at 7, Nichols, 45 F.2d 119 (No. 4).
61. Id. at 7–8.
62. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 122.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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A few years later, a defendant tried a similar approach in
Arnstein v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp. 65 The case involved similar
pop songs, 66 probably the first of what in the next Section we show
would become a long line of music cases where the defense tried to
minimize the originality of the author’s work by introducing
anticipatory prior art. 67 It contended that the plaintiff’s music consisted
of nothing more than sequences that “were to be found in previous
musical compositions of some of the great musical masters of the
past.” 68 The court rejected that argument on the ground that requiring
a composition to be original to its composer “does not necessarily mean
it is an absolutely new production.” 69
One of the clearest rejections of such an anticipation defense
came in another Learned Hand chestnut decided the following year,
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp. 70 That case is probably most
famous today for Learned Hand’s memorable line, already mentioned
above, that imagined competing yet somehow independently created
“Odes on a Grecian Urn.” 71 Less frequently quoted is Hand’s language
that immediately preceded that line:
We are to remember that it makes no difference how far the play was anticipated by works
in the public demesne which the plaintiffs did not use. The defendants appear not to
recognize this, for they have filled the record with earlier instances of the same dramatic
incidents and devices, as though, like a patent, a copyrighted work must be not only
original, but new. . . . [I]t is plain beyond peradventure that anticipation as such cannot
invalidate a copyright. 72

This passage from Sheldon served as Hand’s emphatic proclamation of
the point that he only gestured at six years earlier in Nichols. Authors
cannot be anticipated.

65. 11 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1935), decree aff’d, 82 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1936).
66. Or, as the district court put it in a scathing review nested within a judicial opinion,
“[n]either is a work of great merit, both being popular songs of the kind that have a limited vogue
and soon pass into the great limbo of forgotten songs, never to be resurrected.” Arnstein, 11 F.
Supp. at 535.
67. See infra Section I.B.2.
68. Arnstein, 11 F. Supp. at 535.
69. Id. at 536. Curiously, the court thought that this principle made copyright more like
patent law, not less. It continued:
[A] new arrangement of an old piece may be copyrighted, provided it is more than
a mere copy with variations, and the same test is to be applied as in the case of
patents; that is, it must indicate an exercise of inventive genius as distinguished
from mere mechanical skill or change.
Id. (emphasis added). For more on the line of copyright cases demanding patent-like “inventive
genius,” see Fishman, supra note 24.
70. 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936).
71. Id. at 54; see supra note 37.
72. Sheldon, 81 F.2d at 54.
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Barely a month later, in perhaps the most surprising turn in this
history, the chairman of the House Committee on Patents introduced a
copyright reform bill that seemingly rejected Hand’s premise. 73 The bill
was one of several attempts at a general revision of the 1909 Copyright
Act by Congressman William Sirovich. 74 Many of the bill’s wide-ranging
provisions were debated extensively on the House floor. Then, tucked
away under a heading on Rules of Practice, came one that wasn’t: “In
all actions for infringement of the copyright in any work, the court shall
receive and consider expert and other evidence, as to source material in
the public domain, the prior art, and on the issue of infringement.” 75
This provision, which isn’t discussed anywhere in the legislative
history, is cryptic. It could be read narrowly to do little more than
reaffirm the courts’ duty to ensure that the author indeed created the
work rather than copying it, or perhaps that the defendant indeed
copied the work rather than created it. Certainly the inclusion of the
“source material” language indicates a goal of excluding someone’s
copying. But it could also plausibly be read more broadly. “Prior art” is
set apart from “source material” in the catalog of items that judges are
instructed to consider. And if “source material” isn’t modifying “prior
art,” courts would be required to investigate the prior art in all
infringement proceedings, full stop—just as in a patent case.
Had the proposed rule taken hold, it would have abruptly
upended Hand’s month-old admonition that anticipation cannot
invalidate a copyright. 76 If you were going to choose someone in
government to meld copyright and patent this way, at least Sirovich—
who was not only the patents committee chairman but also a Broadway
playwright—looked the part. 77 But the bill didn’t advance, and its
provision on prior art remains an obscurity that has never reappeared.
Throughout the remaining decades before the 1976 Act’s
passage, defendants occasionally continued to invoke prior art. And
they continued to fail. 78 By the time of that Act’s passage, treatise
73. See H.R. 11420, 74th Cong. (1936).
74. See ABE A. GOLDMAN, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION STUDIES: THE HISTORY OF U.S.A.
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION FROM 1901 TO 1954, at 7–9 (1955) (summarizing the many copyright
revision bills that Sirovich introduced during this period).
75. H.R. 11420 § 41(a), at 50.
76. See Sheldon, 81 F.2d at 54 (“[I]t is plain beyond peradventure that anticipation as such
cannot invalidate a copyright.”).
77. William Irving Sirovich, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HIST., ART & ARCHIVES,
https://history.house.gov/People/Listing/S/SIROVICH,-William-Irving-(S000452)/ (last visited
Mar. 18, 2022) [https://perma.cc/BV9X-2QJQ].
78. See, e.g., Detective Comics v. Bruns Publ’ns, 111 F.2d 432, 433 (2d Cir. 1940) (“The prior
art is only relevant as bearing on the question whether an alleged infringer has copied the author
or has taken his material directly from the prior art.”); Baron v. Leo Feist, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 686,
690 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (disregarding evidence of similar songs that predated the plaintiff’s because
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author Melville Nimmer had seen enough to lament over defendants’
“common practice” of “pointing out a similar work created in antiquity,
or at least prior to the defendant’s creation.” 79 Such facts, Nimmer
admonished, would offer “no assistance unless the trier of fact believes
that the defendant copied from such works.” 80 Some members of the
defense bar might have thought that finding a close-enough predecessor
to the plaintiff’s work would defeat a claim, but courts certainly didn’t.
2. Modern Case Law
Most contemporary commentators have internalized that lesson
well. Like the judges from the first half of the twentieth century, they
generally don’t recognize any use for prior art within copyright
adjudication except for ferreting out whether one of the parties copied
the expression at issue. 81 There would be no room, by contrast, to argue
that a particular similarity between the parties’ works is less
substantial just because it had been anticipated in the preexisting
literature.
But tell that to the plaintiff in Johannsongs-Publishing Ltd. v.
Lovland, whose infringement claim was dismissed in 2020 precisely for
failing to rebut that very argument. 82 Three separate times, the trial
judge called the reports submitted by the plaintiff’s expert “fatally
flawed,” all for the apparently mortal sin of omitting a prior art search.
Because those reports “fail[ed] to consider prior art,” their comparison
of the parties’ works necessarily “fail[ed] to filter out unprotectable
prior art elements.” 83 As a result, the court declared, that expert’s

“[i]t is immaterial that other songs are similar unless it casts doubt upon the originality
(copyrightability) of plaintiff’s song or upon the fact that defendant copied plaintiff’s song”), decree
aff’d, 173 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1949); Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090,
1093 n.3 (2d Cir. 1977) (“[P]rior works in the public domain do not . . . reduce the protection from
copying afforded [the plaintiff’s work] by its copyright.”); see also George E. Frost, Comments and
Views Submitted to the Copyright Office on the Registration of Copyright (October 5, 1958), in
SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS, S. COMM ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG. 71,
71 (Comm. Print 1960) (contrasting patent examination, where “the main emphasis . . . is the ‘prior
art’ and the search by which the examiner locates that art,” with copyright registration, where
“the originality concept of the copyright law makes ‘prior art’ immaterial”).
79. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 101.6, at 381 (1976 ed.).
80. 1 id. at 381–82.
81. See, e.g., 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 5, §§ 2.01[A][2], 8.01[C]; Selz, supra note 9,
§ 16:13.50; see supra text accompanying notes 3–9.
82. No. CV 18-10009, 2020 WL 2315805, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2020), aff’d, No. 20-55552,
2021 WL 5564626 (9th Cir. Nov. 29, 2021).
83. Id.
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opinion about the two works’ similarities was “legally deficient and
irrelevant.” 84
The plaintiff appealed—but not, as the conventional account
might predict, on the ground that prior art was conceptually irrelevant
to substantial similarity. On the contrary, the plaintiff seemed to agree
with the lower court’s premise that prior art mattered. 85 Its theory of
the case was, rather, that the particular prior art that the defendant
had proffered was simply insufficient. 86
Shortly before this Article went to press, the Ninth Circuit
summarily affirmed the lower court’s decision. It held that the trial
judge didn’t abuse his discretion in excluding the expert’s reports
“because they failed to filter out similarities that are attributable to
prior art.” 87 The preceding Section’s rundown of black-letter doctrine
should make this move look radical. And yet here both bench and bar
treated it as thoroughly uncontroversial.
A few months after the district court’s decision in Johannsongs,
the court in Smith v. The Weeknd similarly dismissed an infringement
claim after concluding that the plaintiff’s expert report was inadequate
for omitting “any information about prior art.” 88 The defendant’s expert,
by contrast, referenced three earlier songs that shared expressive
qualities in common with the two parties’ works. 89 On the strength of
only those three preexisting works, the court filtered out nearly all of
the expressive elements that had supported the claim, leaving nothing
left for the plaintiff to sue over. 90
Johannsongs and Smith are the strongest exemplars of prior
art’s newly invigorated role in music copyright infringement disputes.
But they weren’t the first. In 2016, for example, a court dismissed an
84. Id. The court later explained: “[T]he point is to eliminate the non-protectible prior art
components from the songs in issue, and then compare the protectable remainder, to see how
similar that protectible remainder is. A comparison that includes both unprotectible and
protectible elements is invalid under the extrinsic test and is legally irrelevant.” Id. at *6
(emphasis omitted).
85. See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 13–14, Johannsongs-Publishing, Ltd., 2021 WL 5564626
(Nos. 20-55759 and 20-55552) (arguing, for example, that defendant’s expert “uses rigidly narrow
criteria in comparing Sokundur with Raise, yet adopts vastly more flexible criteria in comparing
prior art to the two works at issue”); id. at 14 (“A consistent comparison process is the only accurate
way to evaluate the similarities here, and to assess the works’ originality as compared to prior
art.”).
86. See id. at 15–18.
87. Johannsongs-Publishing, Ltd., 2021 WL 5564626 at *1.
88. Smith v. The Weeknd, No. CV 19-2507, 2020 WL 4932074, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2020),
aff’d sub nom. Clover v. Tesfaye, No. 20-55861, 2021 WL 4705512 (9th Cir. Oct. 8, 2021).
89. Id. at *3.
90. See id. at *6 (relying on defendant’s expert to determine that, after removing similarities
in prior art, only “three notes of protectable elements remain” in common between the parties’
songs).
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infringement claim after the plaintiff’s expert “did not do a search of
prior art” and thus, in the court’s view, had no factual basis on which to
opine that the plaintiff’s allegedly copied expression was “unusual.” 91
Likewise, a 2011 case criticized the plaintiffs’ experts for opining on the
works’ substantial similarity without “not[ing] any relevant prior art.” 92
The dismissive takes that had accurately described courts’
behavior during the previous century thus turn out to be surprisingly
outdated when matched up with case law in the current one.
Defendants today can still use prior art to help prove that they created
the expression independently, just as they always could. 93 But they can
often do a lot more with it, too. Many copyright decisions, especially
those dealing with musical subject matter, in fact welcome authorial
prior art in order to evaluate whether an alleged similarity is
substantial. 94 And at Johannsongs’s extreme, some may even require
it.
Defendants are now quickly seizing on that point in litigation.
In Smith itself, they cited Johannsongs to argue that the report
submitted by the plaintiff’s expert was “fatally flawed because he did
not consider prior art.” 95 In another case, the defendants argued that
91. Connor Bowen v. Paisley, No. 13-cv-0414, 2016 WL 4480165, at *8, *12, *15 (M.D. Tenn.
Aug. 25, 2016).
92. Batts v. Adams, No. CV 10-8123, 2011 WL 13217923, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2011).
93. See, e.g., Granite Music Corp. v. United Artists Corp., 532 F.2d 718, 720 (9th Cir. 1976)
(“Evidence of similar musical phrases appearing in prior works is . . . logically relevant to rebut
the inference of copying. Such evidence demonstrates that the musical language was of such
ordinary and common occurrence that the probability of independent, coincidental production was
great.”); Lester v. U2 Ltd., No. CV 07-06612, 2009 WL 10673938, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (denying
summary judgment to the defendants but noting that “the existence of prior art is relevant to
whether the [defendants] copied”); Gooch v. Raymond, No. 09-0891, 2012 WL 13055741, at *4
(M.D. Tenn. Feb. 27, 2012) (describing how the plaintiff’s expert was “forced . . . to recant his
opinion that the similarities between plaintiff’s song and the defendants’ works could only have
occurred through copying” after he had been “confronted” with prior art at his deposition), rep. and
recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 13055742 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 21, 2012); New Old Music Grp.,
Inc. v. Gottwald, 122 F. Supp. 3d 78, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (deciding that, after finding prior art with
elements in common to both parties’ songs, “it may well be that no reasonable juror could find that
[these] similarities . . . would be probative of copying”); Kaseberg v. Conaco, LLC, No. 15-CV-1637,
2019 WL 1641161, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2019) (agreeing, in a dispute over allegedly copied
comedy routines, to admit evidence of similar third-party jokes that predated the plaintiff’s
because those jokes would be “relevant to Defendants’ independent creation defense,” though
refusing to admit comparable evidence for jokes that postdated it); Mark Avsec, “Nonconventional”
Music Analysis and “Disguised” Infringement: Clever Music Tricks to Divide the Wealth of Tin Pan
Alley, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 339, 358–59 (2004) (“Prior art is important because if the relevant
portions already existed in past musical compositions, the fact that they now turn up in both
plaintiff’s and defendant’s musical pieces is not surprising and is not necessarily by itself indicative
of copying.”).
94. See, e.g., Batts, 2011 WL 13217923, at *5 (discussing the role of prior art in the substantial
similarity determination).
95. Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment or,
in the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment at 15, Smith v. Tesfaye, No. 19-cv-02507, 2020 WL
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the failure of the plaintiff’s expert “to conduct a reliable prior art search
renders his Report defective and his testimony inadmissible.” 96 In yet
another, the defendants contended that “neither the ‘combination’ or
selection and arrangement of . . . individual elements constituted
copyrightable expression based on . . . undisputed prior art,” and
faulted the plaintiffs’ expert for “fail[ing] to rebut prior art showing
such ‘combination’ was . . . unprotectable.” 97
This use of prior art as a shield against substantial similarity is
happening almost exclusively in music cases. 98 We suspect that there
are several possible reasons for this skew. First, music infringement
cases have become expert driven to an extent unmatched by other
copyright fields outside of software. 99 It wasn’t always so. In 1977, when
first laying out its framework for assessing substantial similarity, the
4932074 (C.D. Cal. June 1, 2020) (No. 113-1). In defending against the plaintiff’s subsequent
appeal, the defendants pushed this point even further. See Answering Brief at *45–46, Clover v.
Tesfaye, No. 19-cv-2507, 2021 WL 4705512 (9th Cir. Apr. 28, 2021) (No. 20-55861) (arguing that
the opposing expert “has an established history of claiming substantial similarity by pointing to
random unprotectable similarities taken out of context, and failing to consider prior art,” and that
he had “lived up to his reputation in this case”).
96. Defendants’ Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Their Motion to Preclude
Dr. Alexander Stewart from Testifying at Trial at 4, Griffin v. Sheeran, No. 17-cv-5221, 2020 WL
5627840 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2020); see also Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of their
Motion to Preclude Dr. Alexander Stewart from Testifying at Trial at 15, Griffin, 2020 WL 5627840
(arguing that the same opposing expert’s opinions that the musical element at issue “was not
commonplace” and could “not be found in prior works” should not be credited without “an
appropriate and reliable prior art analysis,” and that “[t]he absence of any reference to any search
for prior art makes the [expert’s] Report defective”).
97. Appellees’ Brief at 17, 40, Gray v. Hudson, No. 20-55401 (9th Cir. Mar. 29, 2021)
(emphasis omitted).
98. There are occasional exceptions dealing with other subject matter, however. See Briggs
v. Blomkamp, 70 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (film); 8th Wonder Ent., LLC v. Viacom
Int’l, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-01748-DDP-JCG, 2016 WL 6882832, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2016)
(television show). We also would not be surprised to see prior art used in this way in software
cases, another area where experts tend to play an indispensable role. But our search of the case
law did not uncover such usage, at least not with the same “prior art” terminology. To be sure,
some key software copyright decisions examine an earlier third-party work in order to assess
whether the defendant’s copying was necessary to interoperate with it. See, e.g., Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel,
Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1375–76 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that the plaintiff’s code for a call controller
was unprotectable because “some of the values for the set of command codes that were actually
copied were dictated by the need for compatibility with older-model [hardware] or the limits on the
capabilities of the controller itself,” while “[o]ther values were dictated by the limits inherent in
the public telephone networks that the call controllers accessed”); Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v.
Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 715 (2d Cir. 1992) (affirming the district court’s conclusion that the two
allegedly infringed aspects of the code’s structure “was dictated by the nature of other programs
with which [that code] was designed to interact and, thus, is not protected by copyright”). But that
is an analytically distinct move from the one we are focused on here, in which earlier third-party
works make the plaintiff’s expression appear less creative on its own terms, with no compatibility
issues at stake.
99. See Joseph P. Fishman, Tonal Concept and Feel, 38 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 655, 667–
68 (2020) (describing the unusually important role of experts in music infringement cases relative
to other copyright disputes).
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Ninth Circuit described expert testimony as potentially
“appropriate.” 100 In 2000, however, the court elevated the importance of
expert evidence in music cases, concluding that the test “often
requires . . . expert testimony.” 101 Four years later, the court restated
that proposition, but this time without the word “often”—experts were
simply required, full stop. 102 And, to put an exclamation point on that
proposition, in 2018 the court declared that adjudicating claims of
nonliteral music infringement couldn’t even function without experts
on hand: “It is unrealistic to expect district courts to possess even a
baseline fluency in musicology . . . . After all, we require parties to
present expert testimony in musical infringement cases for a reason.” 103
In requiring expert testimony to help fact finders evaluate
substantial similarity, musical subject matter is an outlier within
copyright infringement litigation. The traditional rule is that experts
should speak only to whether the alleged similarities resulted from
copying or from independent creation, not to whether those similarities
are substantial as a normative matter. 104 That’s been the system ever
since the Second Circuit’s hugely influential 1946 decision in Arnstein
v. Porter. 105 By moving away from that system over the past twenty
years, music cases have evolved to give experts an unusually large
platform to opine on whether similarities are substantial or not.
As we argue below in Part II, a small number of expert witnesses
who stand on that platform are having an outsized role in focusing
courts on prior art. Relative to other copyright disputes, music cases
give experts disproportionately frequent opportunities to make that
kind of impact.
100. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th
Cir. 1977).
101. Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000).
102. Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2004).
103. Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1137 (9th Cir. 2018).
104. See, e.g., Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 982 F.2d at 713 (noting that “[s]ince the test for illicit
copying is based upon the response of ordinary lay observers, expert testimony is thus ‘irrelevant’
and not permitted,” though making an exception for software due to its technical complexity);
Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir. 1975) (“[S]ubstantial similarity
to show that the original work has been copied is not the same as substantial similarity to prove
infringement. . . . [D]issection and expert testimony in the former setting are proper but are
irrelevant when the issue turns to unlawful appropriation.”); see also Mark A. Lemley, Our Bizarre
System for Proving Copyright Infringement, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 719, 738–39 (2010) (“[A]
strict application of [this rule] means that in any case in which copying is admitted, expert
testimony should be entirely inadmissible, since the only remaining question is improper
appropriation, which is to be judged by the ordinary observer . . . without the benefit of expert
testimony.”).
105. 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (“If there is evidence of access and similarities exist, then
the trier of facts must determine whether the similarities are sufficient to prove copying. On this
issue, . . . the testimony of experts may be received to aid the trier of fact.”).
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A second possible reason for the prevalence of prior art in music
cases is that judges are probably less confident taking judicial notice of
commonality in musical composition than they are in more narrative
subject matter areas like literature or film. 106 In the scènes à faire
context, judges frequently appear comfortable offering their personal
take on what’s standard in, say, a Hollywood movie. 107 As one
experienced copyright litigator has noted, “[S]ometimes, you can just
simply argue that something is subject to judicial notice in a motion to
dismiss and the court will simply accept it. . . . Some courts will simply
say, ‘I don’t need more proof that superheroes in capes are common to
the genre.’ ” 108 That sort of analysis proceeds essentially by intuition
alone. In music, by contrast, few judges probably feel those intuitions
as strongly. Judges don’t typically have the vocabulary or training to
venture off on their own to identify a specific compositional element
within a work, or to then evaluate whether that element is creative or
mundane. 109 If judges perceive that as a barrier to entry, it gives experts
an opening to introduce specific earlier works that can provide
guideposts on whether a particular musical move seems creatively
significant.

106. Cf. Walker, supra note 53, at 456 (“Rather than generating thoughtful analysis regarding
what elements are protected and why, scènes à faire acts as a kind of copyright-specific judicial
notice, decreeing that certain aspects of a work are unprotected without the need for explanation
or supporting evidence.”).
107. See, e.g., Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1985) (refusing to grant
protection over “depictions of the small miseries of domestic life, romantic frolics at the beach, and
conflicts between ambitious young people on one hand, and conservative or evil bureaucracies on
the other,” reasoning that “[t]hese familiar scenes and themes are among the very staples of
modern American literature and film” and that the parties’ works “merely remind[ ] us that in
Hollywood, as in the life of men generally, there is only rarely anything new under the sun”); Zella
v. E.W. Scripps Co., 529 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1129 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (taking judicial notice that it’s
common for television shows to feature “(a) a host; (b) guest celebrities, (c) an interview; and (d) a
cooking segment . . . because these elements are generally known and can be verified simply by
watching television for any length of time”); Bernal v. Paradigm Talent & Literary Agency, 788 F.
Supp. 2d 1043, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (contrasting the parties’ dispute over a film script with a
hypothetical dispute involving “a highly technical area of expertise,” such as “a patent case
comparing two technical devices, or a copyright case involving computer software or music,”
because “this case involves . . . works [that] are targeted at a general audience and deal with
subject matter readily understandable by any ordinary person, including the Court,” reducing the
need for expert guidance).
108. Cendali, supra note 49, at 416.
109. See Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1137 (9th Cir. 2018) (criticizing the dissenting
judge’s independent musicological analysis of the parties’ works because it “does not provide a
workable standard for district courts to follow,” and observing that “[i]t is unrealistic to expect
district courts to possess even a baseline fluency in musicology, much less to conduct an
independent musicological analysis at a level as exacting as the one used by the dissent”).
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A third reason for the skew toward music cases is that they make
some judges especially concerned about managing copyright scope. 110
Take, for example, Gray v. Perry, a headline-grabbing case in which the
judge overturned a jury verdict against pop star Katy Perry over an
ostinato in her song’s underlying track. 111 The court downplayed the
extent of the claimed similarity because, when measured against the
prior art, the allegedly copied elements did not form “a particularly
unique or rare combination.” 112 Of course, uniqueness or rareness have
never been the traditional bars that a copyright plaintiff would need to
clear in order to establish actionable similarity. Nevertheless, the court
explained that music cases should receive special treatment:
Although there is generally a low bar for originality in copyright, given the limited
number of notes and chords available to composer, and because common themes
frequently reappear in various compositions, many if not most of the elements that appear
in popular music are not individually protectable. Music, perhaps more than any other
work of art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which was well known
and used before. For this reason, courts in musical copyright cases have a significant
obligation to . . . limit[ ] the scope of copyright protection to truly original expression
only. 113

We found that courts’ interest in prior art typically comes up
where the plaintiff’s claim centers on a short fragment, rather than on
similarities that permeate the entire work. 114 Such claims are probably
the ones where a searcher could most easily find the relevant expression
in an earlier work to begin with. The shorter and less complex the
110. See, e.g., id. at 1142 (Nguyen, J., dissenting) (“Requiring similarities to be substantial is
of heightened importance in cases involving musical compositions.”); Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d
1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting “the limited number of notes and chords available to composers
and the resulting fact that common themes frequently reappear in various compositions, especially
in popular music”); Arnstein v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 82 F.2d 275, 277 (2d Cir. 1936)
(observing that musical devices “do not admit of so many agreeable permutations that we need be
amazed at the re-appearance of old themes”).
111. Gray v. Perry, No. 15-CV-05642, 2020 WL 1275221 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2020), aff’d sub
nom Gray v. Hudson, 28 F.4th 87 (9th Cir. 2022). An “ostinato” is a “repetition of a musical pattern
many times in succession while other musical elements are generally changing.” Laure Schnapper,
MUSIC
ONLINE
(2001),
Ostinato,
GROVE
https://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/grovemusic/view/10.1093/gmo/9781561592630.001.0001/omo9781561592630-e-0000020547 [https://perma.cc/A6N8-467P].
112. Gray, 2020 WL 1275221, at *10.
113. Id. at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
114. See, e.g., Lil’ Joe Wein Music, Inc. v. Jackson, No. 06-20079-CIV, 2006 WL 5428227, at *5
(S.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2006) (relying on prior art in both music and film to hold that the lyrical phrase
“Go, it’s your birthday” is “unprotectible because it uses a common musical and lyrical phrase that
has been use in other prior works”), aff’d, 245 F. App’x 873 (11th Cir. 2007); Roberts v. Gordy, No.
13-24700-CIV, 2015 WL 12911328, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 15, 2015) (dismissing an infringement
claim on summary judgment after the defendant showed that several songs released prior to the
plaintiff’s used the allegedly copied lyrical phrase “everyday I’m hustlin,” rendering it
unprotectable); Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1254 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (relying on prior
art to reject a claim over a short sequence of notes), aff’d, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2002).
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sequence of information, the more likely it has already appeared at
some point.
In disputes over nonliteral similarity, these decisions in the
aggregate provide accused infringers an emerging line of defense. Even
where an expressive element has not reached the level of outright
ubiquity to qualify as scènes à faire, its anticipation in earlier works
could still reduce its weight in the substantial similarity analysis. In
this way, authorial prior art can help courts draw the difficult line
between protectable expression and unprotectable ideas. 115 As Rebecca
Tushnet has noted, “Works exist within a field of other
works. . . . Looking at prior art in copyright could help define what
constitutes protectable expression and what is merely an idea or
concept that should not be subject to any single creator’s control.” 116 Our
research suggests that in some cases, this approach is already
happening.
To be sure, not every contemporary decision follows this trend.
Outside of musical subject matter, one recent fabric-design case refused
to use prior art to weaken an alleged similarity’s significance, instead
doubling down on the traditional approach. 117 The Ninth Circuit there
disregarded an expert report opining that the design’s floral motif had
been anticipated by numerous other such motifs “found in many prior
art materials in the public domain.” 118 That was the wrong
copyrightability standard to apply, the court explained, because
“similarity of one design to another has no bearing on whether [the
author] independently created the subject design.” 119 When the
defendants then tried to argue that at least the anticipated elements
should be filtered out of the infringement analysis, the court again
brushed it aside. “That the Subject Design may not be novel,” it
reasoned, “is immaterial to the question whether it is original.” 120
Even within music infringement cases, there were a few
decisions in the 2000s that were similarly dismissive. 121 In Lester v. U2,
115. See, e.g., Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960)
(“[N]o principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the ‘idea,’ and has
borrowed its ‘expression.’ Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc.”).
116. Rebecca Tushnet, The Eye Alone Is the Judge: Images and Design Patents, 19 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 409, 424 (2012).
117. See Desire, LLC v. Manna Textiles, Inc., 986 F.3d 1253, 1259 (9th Cir. 2021).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1259–60 (internal quotation marks omitted).
120. Id. at 1261 (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. See, e.g., Ulloa v. Universal Music & Video Distrib. Corp., 303 F. Supp. 2d 409, 414 n.6
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Defendants’ arguments regarding the similarity of the Vocal Phrase to other
musical works in the public domain are not relevant in an originality inquiry where, as here,
copying is conceded.”); BMS Ent./Heat Music LLC v. Bridges, No. 04 Civ. 2584, 2005 WL 1593013,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2005):
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for example, the defendant argued that an allegedly copied guitar riff
could not support an infringement claim because it was too similar to a
particular “prior art composition.” 122 The court disagreed, remarking
that “the existence of prior art that is substantially similar to a
copyrighted work does not defeat copyright protection.” 123 A work might
indeed overlap with an “old or stock situation,” but, citing Nimmer’s
treatise, the court concluded that “unless the trier of fact is persuaded
that plaintiff copied from such old or stock situation, he may not be
denied relief merely because his work is not novel.” 124
It’s fair to say, then, that judges’ recent embrace of prior art in
copyright cases hasn’t been uniform. It’s still primarily a musicinfringement phenomenon, and even there only in the last several
years. Still, given how unanimously courts had once opposed
recognizing authorial prior art as a feature of copyright doctrine, the
shift remains striking. At least in music cases, the concept of authorial
prior art is becoming normalized. In the following Part, we explore why.
II. EXPLAINING PRIOR ART’S RISE: THE ROLE OF EXPERTS
What accounts for prior art’s growing foothold in music
copyright litigation? There are likely several factors at work, but as we
explain below, we think that a fundamental one is the influence of a
small cadre of expert witnesses.
To begin with, courts’ renewed interest in authorial prior art
wouldn’t be the first example of “patentization” of copyright law. Since
the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Sony Corp. v. Universal City
Studios, which asserted that the two regimes share a “historic
kinship,” 125 courts have repeatedly justified applying precedent from

Despite the defendants’ efforts to portray the plaintiffs’ composition . . . as unoriginal,
the facts submitted on this motion do not foreclose the possibility that this case falls
within the Second Circuit’s classic example of “a man who had never known it”
composing anew Keats’s “Ode on a Grecian Urn.”;
Lester v. U2 Ltd., No. CV 07-06612, 2009 WL 10673938, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2009) (“Moreover,
after listening to recordings of the riffs and drawing inferences in a manner most favorable to [the
plaintiff], the Court concludes that reasonable minds could differ on the issue of substantial
similarity.”).
122. Lester, 2009 WL 10673938, at *3.
123. Id.
124. Id. (quoting 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 5, § 2.01[A]).
125. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984). In the exact
context of Sony, the Court relied on the kinship to justify applying the Patent Act’s “staple article
or commodity of commerce” limitation on contributory infringement, 35 U.S.C. § 271(c), even
though the Copyright Act lacks any such limitation—or, indeed, any contributory infringement
provision whatsoever.
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one area to another. 126 Observers have noted various areas of copyright
law where patent law has influenced judges’ approach, from secondary
liability 127 to registration practices 128 to derivative works. 129 Courts’
focus on prior art in music cases should be understood against this
backdrop.
On top of that long-term trend, it’s possible that more recent
doctrinal developments within copyright law have increased some
judges’ desire for tools to dispose of music infringement cases. Since a
federal jury returned its infringement verdict in the “Blurred Lines”
case in 2015, the popular press has persistently reported on rising
perceptions of risk among musicians and publishers who no longer can
tell whether they’re treading too close to another’s song. 130 The
dissenting judge on the appellate panel that affirmed that judgment
sounded an alarm when she cautioned that the majority was allowing
the copyright owner to “accomplish what no one has before: copyright a

126. See, e.g., Harris v. Emus Recs. Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Where
precedent in copyright cases is lacking, it is appropriate to look for guidance to patent law ‘because
of the historic kinship between patent law and copyright law.’ ” (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 439)).
The Supreme Court has invoked this “kinship” rationale most recently in Impression Products,
Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc. in support of a rule that a foreign sale of a patented item
exhausts U.S. patent rights in that item, just as it would for a copy of a copyrighted work. 137 S.
Ct. 1523, 1536 (2017). For a survey of lower-court references to this language, see David W. Barnes,
Abuse of Supreme Court Precedent: The “Historic Kinship,” 16 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 85
(2016).
127. See, e.g., 6 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 21:42 (2021) (commenting that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913
(2005), which held a peer-to-peer filesharing platform liable for inducing infringement, “represents
a recent phenomenon, the ‘patentization’ of copyright law”); id. § 21:79 (“The latest statutory
patent liability judicially legislated into the Copyright Act by the Supreme Court is
inducement. . . . [T]he new theory has no roots in copyright law. The entirety of Grokster’s
discussion of its new theory is patent based . . . .”).
128. See Steven J. Metalitz, Copyright Registration After Feist: New Rules and Roles?, 17 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 763, 766 (1992) (criticizing a court’s decision to invalidate the registrant’s
copyright after it “fail[ed] to disclose prior art adequately to the Copyright Office in the registration
process,” which “seemed to import a very patent-like standard of disclosure to a copyright
registration setting”).
129. See Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual
Property, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81, 122–24 (1998) (summarizing a court’s decision to deny
copyrightability to a musical arrangement based on its proximity to what other musicians could
do, and lamenting that it “sounds so much more like patent than copyright doctrine”).
130. See, e.g., Ben Sisario, “Blurred Lines” on Their Minds, Songwriters Create Nervously, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/31/business/media/plagiarism-musicsongwriters.html [https://perma.cc/6Y56-DLPA]; Why American Songwriters Are Suing Each
Other, ECONOMIST (May 13, 2021), https://www.economist.com/business/2021/05/13/whyamerican-songwriters-are-suing-each-other
[https://perma.cc/X8TG-RL83]
(reporting
that
“[b]etween 1844 and 2014 no more than eight [music copyright] cases a year were heard in
American federal courts,” while “[t]he past six years have seen an average of 16”); Wang, supra
note 13 (describing how “the once-sleepy realm of music copyright law has turned into a
minefield”).

1186

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:4:1159

musical style.” 131 She accused the majority of “establish[ing] a
dangerous precedent that strikes a devastating blow to future
musicians and composers everywhere.” 132 This judicial decision may
have put the musical similarity issue more centrally on judges’ radar,
just as it did for many within the industry. 133
Another significant legal change came from the Supreme Court,
which in a 2014 decision eliminated the laches defense as a bar to
copyright infringement actions. 134 That change allowed legacy artists
(or their estates) to file lawsuits over allegedly infringing adaptations
that were written decades ago, limited only by the Copyright Act’s
three-year limitations period as a cap on damages. The classic rock
band Spirit, for example, could sue Led Zeppelin over a claim that
“Stairway to Heaven” infringed its earlier song “Taurus,” despite the
fact that “Stairway” was written all the way back in 1971. 135 Here,
again, we can only conjecture what spillover effect this might have on
judges’ handling of music infringement more generally. But it’s at least
plausible that as the Supreme Court invites in more claims, district
court judges could become more interested in finding ways to winnow
the number down.
Alongside these doctrinal developments, technology is
improving. It’s far more feasible today to search for copyright prior art
than it used to be. The development of the internet and improvements
in data storage and analytics have allowed sophisticated parties to
perform queries that once would have been time- or cost-prohibitive. 136
Nevertheless, even given all of these changes in the background,
we doubt that authorial prior art would have made it this far without
the efforts of expert witnesses. Pulling back the judicial decisions’
curtain and looking at the experts’ work product, we find that those
same experts’ norm entrepreneurship has pioneered the concept of
authorial prior art. After a long period of accumulating expectations, a
131. Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1138 (9th Cir. 2018) (Nguyen, J., dissenting).
132. Id.
133. One influential treatise went so far as to call the case “a stain on the federal judiciary” in
which “[e]xpert witnesses were allowed to usurp the role of the jury.” 3 PATRY, supra note 127,
§ 9:247.30. “We would be better off banning all expert witnesses,” it continued, “than tolerating
such a fundamental failure.” Id. We don’t subscribe to that dire assessment ourselves.
Nevertheless, its prominent inclusion within the treatise highlights how much negative publicity
the “Blurred Lines” litigation has received within the copyright bar.
134. Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 668 (2014).
135. See Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (“One may
wonder how a suit so long in the making could survive a laches defense. The Supreme Court
answered this question in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., which clarified that laches is not
a defense where copyright infringement is ongoing.”).
136. See infra Section II.B.3 (reporting our interview data on experts’ use of computer
databases to run prior art searches).
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judge may reasonably feel justified in discarding a plaintiff’s expert
report for failing to engage sufficiently with prior art, just as the court
in Johannsongs did. 137 But ultimately, the courts that do so are making
a move that opposing experts had been urging for years. 138
In order to understand expert witnesses’ role in these copyright
disputes, we collected information from two sources. First, we analyzed
a sampling of experts’ written reports in litigated cases over music
infringement. Because these reports contain the evidence that litigants
are actually putting in front of courts, including in cases that never
generate a written judicial opinion, they offer a more complete picture
of the arguments that judges are exposed to on a regular basis. Second,
to see how the experts themselves think about prior art, we conducted
a series of interviews with several of them who are actively practicing.
Together, these sources show that, unlike what traditional doctrine has
said about the concept in copyright cases, the experts understand prior
art research to be a central part of their professional identity. These
experts, moreover, are convincing. Judges are increasingly relying on
experts for help deciphering the particularly complicated issues of
musical similarity, and those experts in turn are persuading judges to
adopt the same concept of authorial prior art that earlier generations
had once so consistently renounced.
A. Written Reports
The experts who appear in these cases are known as forensic
musicologists. There is no formal academic discipline that defines a
forensic musicologist’s methodology or body of knowledge. Roughly,
though, the role requires the application of musical analysis to the
particular questions that tend to arise in copyright matters. A forensic
musicologist’s educational background typically focuses on music
rather than law. Nevertheless, as we discuss further below in our
summary of our interviews, individual experts can pick up enough from
the lawyers with whom they work to at least be conversant in copyright
basics.
We analyzed fifty forensic musicologist reports that parties filed
in litigated music copyright cases between 1995 and 2020. Of these,
twenty-nine were filed by the defendant and twenty-one by the

137. See Johannsongs-Publishing Ltd. v. Lovland, No. CV 18-10009, 2020 WL 2315805, at *5
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2020) (noting the legal deficiency of the expert’s report due to its failure to
consider the prior art).
138. See infra Section II.A.2.
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plaintiff. 139 Our sample comprises the work product of ten individual
experts. Remarkably, of the defense-side reports, all but six came from
one especially prolific witness: music professor Lawrence Ferrara. 140
For each report, we tracked whether the expert discussed thirdparty works that predated the work-in-suit. If so, we also tracked what
conclusion the expert was using those works to support: an opinion on
whether a similarity supported an inference of actual copying, on
whether a similarity was normatively substantial, or on both.
Generally, it was the defendant’s expert who defined the
universe of prior art at issue. Plaintiff-side experts, by contrast, tended
not to mention specific prior art references except to rebut what the
opposing expert had argued. They did not affirmatively cite earlier
works in order to, say, show how different the author’s expression was
from its predecessors (as would be done, for example, with technological
inventions in a patent prosecution).
Significantly, though, even the plaintiffs’ experts seemed to
work from the premise that prior art would be relevant if it were indeed
close enough to the work-in-suit. Sometimes they announced that they
had undertaken a search themselves and hadn’t found anything. 141
Other times they argued that the defense’s prior art was so inapplicable
that the defense’s reliance on it only demonstrated just how original the

139. Depending on the age of the docket, not every document was available to us in every
dispute.
140. See Lawrence Ferrara, NYU STEINHARDT, https://steinhardt.nyu.edu/people/lawrenceferrara (last visited Feb. 4, 2022) [https://perma.cc/2TFQ-M7JV].
141. See, e.g., Report or Affidavit of Dr. Michael E. Harrington ¶ 4, Lessem v. Taylor, 766 F.
Supp. 2d 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 32-7), 2008 WL 8552599 (“In my opinion, [defendant’s song] is
substantially similar to [plaintiff’s song]. . . . [T]his conclusion is based upon my careful analysis
and transcription of the music and lyrics of [defendant’s and plaintiff’s songs], and my search for
prior and contemporary musical sources.”); Declaration of Sandy Wilbur ¶ 25, Bourne Co. v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 602 F. Supp. 2d 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 33), 2008 WL
2234041 (“I believe this [musical element at issue] is unique since I was unable to find any prior
art (other songs using these four notes in the same way before the publication of [plaintiff’s song].”);
Musicological Comparison/Analysis of “The Reasons Why,” “No More Pain” and “Burn” of George
S. Saadi ¶ 50, Straughter v. Raymond, No. CV 08-2170, 2011 WL 3651350 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2011)
(No. 270-1), 2011 WL 4836131:
I am unaware of any prior song or songs embodying all [allegedly copied] elements. I
am informed that, after three years of litigation, the Defendants have yet to locate and
identify any such song or songs. I am consequently of the opinion that . . . it is
inconceivable for it to be a result of coincidence, or of independent creation, or of both
songs having been based on the same prior source.
Plaintiffs’ lawyers, for their part, also operate from the same premise in court. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s
Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Plaintiff’s Proposed Expert Witness at
11, Watt v. Butler, 744 F. Supp. 2d 1315 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (No. 83), 2010 WL 3253145 (emphasizing
that the expert retained by the plaintiff had “searched prior art to determine whether the
composition . . . is original, and therefore, entitled to copyright protection”).
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author’s expression truly was. 142 But in all instances, prior art
mattered.
In the following Sections, we discuss two of the most striking
throughlines in these expert musicologist reports. First, the experts
regularly use prior art to address the substantiality of similarities
between the parties’ works, and not just the issue of copying. Second,
defense-side reports routinely characterize a prior art search as a
genuine must-have for succeeding on an infringement claim, a
proposition that, as already discussed above, 143 judges have just
recently begun adopting.
1. Actual Copying Versus Substantiality
Plaintiff- and defense-side experts alike nearly always devoted
significant attention to the probability that a similarity between the
parties’ works had resulted from copying rather than coincidence. 144
The appearance of a particular chord progression in both the plaintiff’s
and defendant’s works, for example, may look less suspicious if that
same progression had also appeared in thirteen other works already
published before the plaintiff’s even existed. 145 This use of prior art is
unsurprising. It neatly tracks expert witnesses’ traditional evidentiary
assignment in copyright infringement cases. 146
Yet like the judicial decisions discussed in the previous
Section, 147 experts also frequently used prior art in order to weigh in on
whether similarities were substantial. Take, for example, the two sides’
reports in Jean v. Bug Music, Inc., a case about the alleged infringement
of an R&B song. 148 The accused infringer’s expert argued that melodic
142. See, e.g., Response to the Report of Dr. Lawrence Ferrara at 7, 10, Watt, 744 F. Supp. 2d
1315 (No. 74-2), 2010 WL 4392579:
The search through varied repertories undertaken by Dr. Ferrara in search of prior art
demonstrates one fact indisputably: he has been unable to locate prior art of striking
similarity that would undermine the original status of the [the original author’s
expression]. . . . The failure to find prior art, despite having combed through classical,
pop, rock, and movie soundtrack repertories, highlights the similarity of the [plaintiff’s
song] to the comparable phrase in [the defendant’s song].
143. See supra text accompanying notes 73–82.
144. See, e.g., Report or Affidavit of Lawrence Ferrara ¶ 66, Bradford v. Carter, No. 09-CV00156, 2011 WL 13175669 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 29, 2011) (No. 147-1), 2010 WL 5651752 (opining that
a “commonplace 3-note rhythmic similarity is a result of coincidence, not copying”).
145. See Declaration of Dr. Lawrence J. Ferrara ¶ 7, Griffin v. Sheeran, 351 F. Supp. 3d 492
(S.D.N.Y. 2019) (No. 68), 2018 WL 7197820.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 104–105 (discussing courts’ general rule that an
expert may opine on whether a similarity resulted from copying but not on whether that similarity
is normatively substantial).
147. See supra Section I.B.2.
148. No. 00-CV-4022, 2002 WL 287786 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2002).
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similarity between the parties’ works could also be found in several
preexisting works, thereby “refuting defendants’ claim of original
creation of this melodic phrase.” 149 Many of these works came from
genres that were far afield from the original author’s, such as art music
by composers like Stravinsky, Ravel, and Bartok. The argument was
not that the author had necessarily listened to those compositions, and
so had failed to create the melody independently. Rather, it was that
the melodic phrase simply wasn’t creative enough—too many earlier
authors had already written the same thing. On that basis, the expert
argued, copying it from the copyright owner would be musicologically
insignificant.
The copyright owner’s expert, meanwhile, had earlier opined
that no such prior art was likely to exist. But like his counterpart, he
too began from the proposition that more prior art would weaken the
expression’s protectability, while less prior art would enhance it. 150
Though they disagreed over whether any prior art existed in this
particular case, they agreed on the general principle—prior art affects
a similarity’s substantiality.
Some defense-side reports adopted an even stronger version of
that proposition by going out of their way to bracket the issue of copying
altogether. They clarified upfront that prior art mattered regardless of
whether the defendant had indeed copied from the plaintiff. 151 In other
words, even assuming such copying occurred, it would be immaterial—
the prior art effectively rendered the similarity inconsequential.
Experts frequently referred to prior art affecting the
“originality” of an expressive element within the original songwriter’s
work. As every good copyright attorney knows, originality is a legal
term of art encompassing both a requirement of independent creation
and at least a small degree of creativity. 152 Forensic musicologists may
very well know this principle too, 153 but they were sometimes vague
149. Report or Affidavit of Lawrence Ferrara at 10, Jean, 2002 WL 287786 (No. 00-CV-4022
(DC)), 2000 WL 35934960 (emphasis omitted).
150. Report or Affidavit of Gerald Eskelin ¶ 3, Jean, 2002 WL 287786 (No. 00-CV-4022 (DC)),
1999 WL 35139549 (“It is unlikely that this unique combination of similar elements can be found
in prior musical literature. Therefore, the earlier expression of this musical excerpt appears to be
protectible by copyright and the later expression constitutes an infringement of it.”).
151. See, e.g., Report or Affidavit of Lawrence Ferrara, Ph.D. ¶¶ 92, 96, Watt v. Butler, 744 F.
Supp. 2d 1315 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (No. 1:08-CV-3386-TWT), 2009 WL 6700011 (opining that the
relevant similarity was coincidental but that “[e]ven if there were copying . . . that alleged copying
would represent a fragment of a building block in music which is not original to [plaintiff’s song]
and cannot be monopolized by any composer”).
152. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (stating that
“originality requires independent creation plus a modicum of creativity”).
153. See Interview with Expert D (Oct. 1, 2020) (“[T]he word novel . . . is not really copyright
law. . . . I view it as ‘original’ often means it’s original to the creator, the creator did it.”); Interview
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about whether their references to “originality” meant independent
creation, creativity, or both. For example, in one case a defense-side
expert explained that the similar melody in the two parties’ works had
also appeared in numerous German folk songs from centuries ago. 154 He
didn’t conjecture that the original songwriter had derived the melody
directly from those folk songs. 155 Nevertheless, in the expert’s view, the
folk songs’ existence buttressed the conclusion that “plaintiff cannot
claim that the music placed in issue represents plaintiff’s original
expression.” 156
The reasoning behind that statement is ambiguous. It might be
that the expression’s repeated appearances in antiquity suggest that
the plaintiff had probably encountered it somewhere before writing the
song, even if he mistakenly thought he came up with it on his own.
Alternatively, it might mean that the expression’s previous
appearances in such old material diminishes its creative significance
today. Or maybe it means both. Across the reports, this sort of imprecise
usage of “originality” sometimes made it difficult to say with certainty
that experts were trying to evaluate how truly novel a song is. 157
But other times they left little doubt. On the basis of only three
prior art references, a defendant’s expert concluded that the melodic
similarity between the parties’ works “is not musicologically
significant” because those works were “closer” to the prior art than they
were to each other. 158 The report did not address the probability that

with Expert B (Oct. 2, 2020) (“There is this whole principle that if it’s not copied then it is original,
so something could be found in prior art, and if it wasn’t copied, then the expression at issue could
still be legally considered original. In a legal sense, original simply means ‘not copied.’ ”). As we
explain further in Section II.B.1 below, we do not identify any interview subjects by name.
154. See, e.g., Report or Affidavit of Lawrence Ferrara, Ph.D. ¶ 45, Griffin v. J-Records, 398 F.
Supp. 2d 1137 (E.D. Wash. 2005) (No. 47-2), 2005 WL 3734135 (“[T]he same[ ] generic sequence of
seven pitches at issue [was] embedded in numerous German folk songs that pre-date the 18th
century. Many of these German folk songs feature the identical sequence of seven pitches at the
end of melodic phrases.”).
155. He also cited a Beatles song, where that derivation conjecture would be far more
plausible. Id. ¶¶ 34–38.
156. Id. ¶ 46.
157. See also, e.g., Expert Declaration of Sandy Wilbur ¶¶ 69, 72, 78, Williams v. Bridgeport
Music, Inc., No. 13-CV-06004, 2015 WL 4479500 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2014) (No. 91-1) (opining that
the individual similarities identified by the plaintiff’s expert are merely “a few of the basic building
blocks of musical composition that are present, if not inevitable, in many songs,” that even together
in combination they “can be found in songs that predate [the copyright owner’s work] and are not
original to [that work],” and that the combination “is neither original nor an indication of
substantial similarity between [the parties’ works] or any other songs that share one or more of
these elements”).
158. Declaration of Dr. Lawrence Ferrara ¶ 6(f), Smith v. Tesfaye, No. 2:19-cv-02507, 2020 WL
4932074 (C.D. Cal. July 6, 2020) (No. 113).
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the plaintiff had heard these songs before. 159 Instead, it simply declared
that the anticipatory references made any similarity musicologically
unimportant. It’s hard to read that statement as anything other than
an incorporation of a novelty standard.
In another case, the same expert likewise opined that his
discovery of four centuries-old Irish folk songs sharing the plaintiff’s
expression “significantly undermines and debilitates” a substantialsimilarity claim. 160 That “prior art,” along with other contemporary
songs, “provides very strong musicological support for finding that
Plaintiff cannot monopolize musical expression that is in common
between the two songs in issue. That expression has been widely used
and available for centuries.” 161 Here, again, this statement doesn’t
depend on the original songwriter having copied anything from anyone.
The expert is telling the court that, even if independently created, the
expression at issue simply has too old an ancestry for any claimant to
assert an infringement claim over it today. 162
2. The Necessity of a Prior Art Search
Over our sample’s entire chronology, defense-side experts have
consistently admonished plaintiff’s experts for rendering an opinion
without having first performed a prior art search. As early as 1998, for
example, a defense expert opined that the opposing witness had
“overlook[ed] a vital concern in determining musical similarity—the
study of prior and contemporary art.” 163 He explained that “[t]o render
a competent opinion as to copyright infringement, a music expert
must be aware of how common or uncommon and therefore how likely
musical elements are to occur independently in two different songs in a
particular style of music.” 164 Knowledge of the prior art is critical
because, if a musical element appears frequently in other songs, then a
159. The references were Blondie’s “Heart of Glass,” the title song for the James Bond film The
World Is Not Enough, and the theme music for the television series, X-Men: The Animated Series.
Id.
160. Declaration of Lawrence Ferrara ¶ 39, Johannsongs-Publ’g Ltd. v. Lovland, No. 18-cv10009, 2020 WL 5077931 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2019),
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Lawrence Ferrara Rebuttal to the Report and Testimony of Thomas Z. Shepard
at 2, 5, Ulloa v. Universal Music, 303 F. Supp. 2d 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (No. 01-CV-9583) (citing
Mozart sonatas, Haydn sonatas, a Beethoven trio, and Couperin’s beginner piano pieces, among
others, as “prior art musical compositions” that show that the expression at issue “has been
commonly used in many genres for centuries and does not rise to the threshold of original
expression”).
163. Affidavit of Dr. E. Michael Harrington ¶ 34(ii), McKinley v. Raye, No. 96-CV-2231P, 1999
WL 47260 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 1999) (No. 58009-2), 1998 WL 35176908.
164. Id.
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similarity between the parties’ works “has little meaning in
determining whether two songs containing the musical element are
‘substantially similar’ in the copyright infringement context.” 165
In a different case, another defense expert similarly proclaimed
that his counterpart had “fail[ed] to consider prior art in connection to
the [musical elements] she places in issue.” 166 As a result, he concluded,
“she does not and cannot opine as to whether those melodies represent
original expression.” 167 In yet another case, that expert argued that the
opposing side’s “failure to complete a requisite prior art search has
blind[ed] his analysis and Report” to how commonplace the relevant
musical elements really were. 168
Defendants in these cases regularly hammer on this notion that
a prior art search is a “must” or a “requisite.” Plaintiff-side experts, for
their part, often downplay how important a documented search really
is. 169 Early on, judges stayed on the sidelines and let the experts duke
it out amongst themselves as to whether everyone had done sufficient
homework. 170
Lately, though, judges are coming around to the idea that a prior
art search really is a must-have. In 2016’s Bowen v. Paisley, for
instance, the defense expert characteristically insisted that the
plaintiff’s report should “fail” because there had been “no search for (or
analysis of) prior art,” and “the absence of any search for (or analysis
of) prior art does not allow [plaintiff’s expert] to filter out the elements
that she places at issue that were in common use prior to [plaintiff’s
song].” 171 The plaintiff in the case pushed back. In opposing summary
judgment, she freely conceded that there had been no search. In fact,
she argued, it would be “an extraordinary theory” to contend that
165. Id.
166. Report or Affidavit of Dr. Lawrence Ferrara, Ph.D: Rebuttal to the Reports of Judith
Finell ¶ 37, Pyatt v. Jean, No. 04-CV-03098, 2006 WL 8440910 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2006) (No. 118),
2005 WL 6521958.
167. Id.
168. Introduction and Summary of Lawrence Ferrara, Ph.D. ¶ 41, Lessem v. Taylor, 766 F.
Supp. 2d 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 32-9), 2009 WL 8140412.
169. See, e.g., Rebuttal of Report by Lawrence Ferrara of November 18, 2015 of Judith Finell,
MA ¶ 33, Bowen v. Paisley, 2016 WL 4480165 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 25, 2016) (No. 113-8), 2016 WL
4256931 (noting matter-of-factly that “it was beyond the scope of our study to conduct a formal
prior art investigation,” but adding that none was necessary because “within my decades of
experience and research within the musical literature, I know of no other song that combines the
same compositional and expressive features shared here”).
170. In the Lessem case mentioned in the previous paragraph, for example, the court held that
“whatever can be made of this [prior art] material’s absence from [the plaintiff-side expert’s] initial
report is left for cross-examination, not exclusion from evidence,” and ultimately denied the
defendants’ summary judgment motion. Lessem, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 512, 515.
171. Report Regarding of Dr. Lawrence Ferrara, Ph.D. ¶ 102, Bowen, 2016 WL 4480165 (No.
118-1), 2015 WL 11253070.
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“originality of a copyrighted work can never be established without
conducting one.” 172 Invoking the traditional rule that the concept of
prior art has no bearing on copyright cases, the plaintiff continued:
Defendants and their expert attempt to confuse the issues by using the misleading term
‘prior art’ a term not typically utilized in copyright law. The term is borrowed from patent
law. . . . The concept of originality in copyright law is fundamentally different from
concepts of anticipation and novelty in patent law. . . . The use is misleading because, in
patent law, which requires novelty as well as originality, a single item of prior art can
invalidate an entire patent. . . . Copyright’s analogous requirement is the much less
stringent requirement that the protected expression arose from the author’s independent
creativity.” 173

But in a move that would have been unthinkable years earlier,
the court sided with the defendant. It stressed that while the plaintiff’s
expert had asserted that certain features of the plaintiff’s work were
“unusual,” that expert had also “concede[d] that she did not conduct a
review of any prior works.” 174 The defense expert, by contrast, did. 175
After reviewing the defense’s prior art (a term that the court used
without comment), the court concluded that regardless of what the
opposing expert might say, the musical features at issue “are not
particularly ‘unusual.’ ” 176 It found no substantial similarity between
the works and dismissed the case. 177
As we discussed in Section I.B.2, over the last two years some
judges have embraced this position so firmly that they are all but
ignoring plaintiffs’ experts in music infringement cases if those experts
haven’t performed a prior art search. 178 Time will tell whether that rule
gains widespread adoption. But whatever its future within the
judiciary, years of expert witness testimony got it this far.

172. Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Bowen, 2016 WL
4480165 (No. 124), 2016 WL 3449522.
173. Id.
174. Bowen, 2016 WL 4480165, at *12.
175. Id.
176. Id. The court emphasized that it was not holding the allegedly copied elements to be
unoriginal for copyright purposes. It concluded that while the defendants had “shown that some
elements of the plaintiff’s expression . . . were used prior to the creation of the [plaintiff’s] Work,”
they still had “not shown that [plaintiff’s] particular use and integration of these features in her
expression of the ‘hook’ in her song is unoriginal.” Id. at *9. Nevertheless, the court decided it was
proper to consider prior art evidence while assessing the degree of similarity between the parties’
works. Id. at *10.
177. Id. at *15.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 82–92.
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B. Interviews
In addition to our review of written expert materials, we
interviewed several forensic musicologists who frequently participate
in copyright infringement matters. The interview subjects revealed a
shared understanding of prior art analysis as central to their work. For
many of them, it affected what deserves legal protection to begin with.
1. Interview Methodology
Our interviews did not use a random sample. In fact, the number
of forensic musicologists who routinely appear in U.S. copyright
litigation is small enough that our interview data covers most of the
relevant population. Using a semi-structured interview format, we
asked the experts whom we spoke with to reflect on what questions they
needed to answer in order to reach a conclusion on an infringement
issue. 179 With that as a baseline, we then asked them to speak to
whether the existence of earlier works with close similarities to the
work-in-suit would be musicologically meaningful to them and why. We
also asked about whether, leaving aside their personal views, they had
seen such similarities persuade a legal decisionmaker before. Finally,
in the interest of cutting through semantics, we asked about what
specific terms they and their colleagues use to refer to those earlier
works.
We targeted our interview requests to musicologists who have
regularly appeared as expert witnesses or who maintain an active
copyright consulting practice. Six agreed to speak with us. Of these, five
were conducted orally over Zoom, while one was conducted through a
written survey in order to accommodate the subject’s schedule. 180 All
but one of the interviewees additionally participated in a follow-up
interview via Zoom. 181 The oral interviews ran approximately one hour
in length (with recorded follow-up interviews averaging an additional
half hour), and most of our subjects opted to speak anonymously. For
this reason, all quotations in this Part use the pronouns “they” and
“their” and are ascribed to a deidentified letter. All oral interviews were
recorded and transcribed; the one written interview was standardized
to reflect the same protocol questions.
179. The Institutional Review Board at our respective institutions approved the interview
protocols.
180. Because we conducted these interviews during the COVID-19 pandemic, all interviews
were necessarily remote.
181. The follow-up sessions allowed us to ask clarifying questions and inquire more deeply into
themes that we noticed during our review of the initial interviews.
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2. What Prior Art Does
Interview subjects generally agreed that an expert should have
familiarity with the relevant musical repertory that predates a work on
which they’re opining. 182 But consistent with the pattern we observed
in experts’ written reports, 183 subjects also told us that it’s up to the
defense expert to raise the issue. “Typically,” one said, “if one is being
hired by the plaintiffs, it is not the burden of the plaintiffs to provide
prior art[,] . . . [whereas] I’ve never known of a defense case that hasn’t
searched for prior art.” 184 Still, they note, “[plaintiff’s experts] often do
that investigation [for prior art] to see whether or not the case is likely
to be challenged in that way.” 185 Another interviewee mentioned that,
while plaintiffs might use the existence of prior art to decide whether
to pursue a claim, for the defense prior art is “a very good defense. In
fact, it’s a common defense.” 186 This subject thought that there had been
“more emphasis on [prior art] in recent years,” and without being
prompted mentioned the Johannsongs decision in which the court had
thrown out a plaintiff-side analysis for lack of a prior art search. 187
Recall that defendants might try to introduce prior art in a
copyright case either in order to rebut an allegation of actual copying
or, perhaps more controversially, in order to challenge the
substantiality of alleged similarities between the works. We discussed
both possibilities with our interview subjects. Strikingly, they embraced
not just the actual copying usage but largely the substantiality one as
well.
182. See Interview with Expert A (Oct. 8, 2020):
[W]e’re asked to opine on . . . the originality of the music involved, in terms of any
similar features, could it be explained by either third party music, or public domain
music, prior art, or for some other reason, that both Song A and Song B utilized
something that is identified as part of a preexisting recording, for example.;
id. (“I always encourage prior art research, regardless of which side is involved, because it’s
a very important part of the sort of combined information that’s needed to make an informed
decision about approach or whether or not to walk away entirely.”); Interview with Expert B
(Oct. 2, 2020):
[Prior art] is of utmost importance, I’d say it’s essential. To do that kind of search is
essential . . . so, yeah, it’s the second phase of my participation in these types of
matters . . . [It is essential to show] whether there is music out there . . . even if it’s just
one piece, but if it was a piece that was widely disseminated, then I think that, for a
plaintiff, that would be pretty much the end of their case.;
Interview with Expert E (Nov. 5, 2020) (“Understanding prior art is a very important part of
forming an opinion.”).
183. See supra Section II.A.2.
184. Interview with Expert A (Oct. 8, 2020).
185. Id.
186. Interview with Expert B (Oct. 2, 2020).
187. Id.; see supra notes 82–87 and accompanying text (discussing Johannsongs).
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We start with copying, which requires less discussion to unpack.
The proposition that prior art could weaken an inference that the
defendant had actually copied anything has always been
unextraordinary. 188 The more works featuring similar expression that
predate the plaintiff’s work, the more plausible a defendant’s allegation
that it just happened to converge around that similarity through pure
coincidence. Maybe the evidence suggests that those earlier works, and
not the plaintiff’s, provided the defendant its true source material. Or
maybe it suggests that the expression at issue is the sort of thing that
many people are likely to produce independently (as might be the case
where fixed physical or cultural constraints funnel individual artists
toward the same creative choices). Either way, the evidence goes toward
gauging the probabilities as to what really happened in the past: Is the
alleged similarity attributable to copying from the plaintiff, or to
something else?
As previously discussed, actual copying has long been the
infringement element most welcoming to proof through expert
testimony. 189 Unsurprisingly, the experts whom we interviewed
unanimously agreed that a big part of their job was to address that
issue, looking at earlier music to see how it might affect the probability
that the accused party had derived the material from somewhere other
than the plaintiff’s work. For instance, one subject told us that “I talk
about copying because copying is a musical act that I can have a
legitimate opinion on.” 190 Further, this subject continued, peers
regularly discuss earlier works as an important part of forming and
defending that opinion. “Every report I’ve ever read where . . . earlier
works are relevant has mentioned [those works’ significance]
because . . . to a musicologist, it’s key. Not necessarily in . . . a direct
line of musical influence, but in inferring the likelihood of coincidental
similarity as opposed to copying.” 191 Another interviewee similarly
explained:
If they’re more similar to each other than they are to any prior art found . . . I would say
that that increases the likelihood that the second work copied the first. If on the other
hand, we find . . . prior art that is more similar to one or both of the other works . . . then
I would say that the possibility of copying declines. 192

188. See, e.g., Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publ’ns, Inc., 111 F.2d 432, 433 (2d Cir. 1940)
(“The prior art is only relevant as bearing on the question whether an alleged infringer has copied
the author or has taken his material directly from the prior art.”).
189. See supra text accompanying note 104.
190. Interview with Expert C (Sept. 24, 2020).
191. Id.
192. Interview with Expert A (Oct. 8, 2020).
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Yet however unremarkable it is to use prior art to disprove
actual copying, using it to attack a similarity’s substantiality as well
seems like a shakier proposition. For one thing, as Section I.B
discussed, up until recently that move had long been a surefire loser in
court. 193 At least that certainly seemed to be the precedential upshot for
most of the twentieth century, from Learned Hand’s admonition that “it
makes no difference how far [a work] was anticipated by works in the
public demesne which the plaintiffs did not use,” 194 to the Supreme
Court’s capstone statement in Feist that “a work may be original even
though it closely resembles other works so long as the similarity is
fortuitous, not the result of copying.” 195 And for another thing, as we
discussed above in the Introduction, many contemporary commentators
still consider a lawyer’s invocation of “prior art” in a copyright case to
be an unwitting admission of ignorance.
Despite that party line, however, our interview subjects
described a duty to evaluate whether allegedly copied compositional
elements were creative enough to be deemed musicologically
substantial. That inquiry would always take place against the backdrop
of what songwriters have previously done. One subject explained that
prior art speaks to what’s essentially a policy question of what belongs
under copyright. In their view, the expert’s task was to determine
whether the music “rises to the level of being worthy of copyright
protection . . . . If I can find that music preexisting in Beethoven and
Bach in blues and public domain type sources, then I would tend to
think it’s not worthy of copy protection.” 196 Put differently, the subject
continued, “[i]t’s original to someone who created it, but it’s not original
expression really, it just comes from somewhere.” 197
To this subject, it wouldn’t matter if the songwriter in question
had ever before encountered those earlier sources. Researching the
prior art isn’t just about a lack of copying, they said, but also to ensure
that legal exclusivity isn’t being handed out for something insufficiently
innovative.
“Something
that
hasn’t
been
done
before.
Unprecedented. . . . That’s what I’m getting at. . . . To me, whatever
word can be used to . . . say this hasn’t happened before, you’re the first
to do this, I think that’s significant. That would deserve more copy
protection.” 198 The more frequently a given element of expression has
appeared in the past, this subject continued, the less it can claim
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

See supra Section I.B.1.
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 53 (2d Cir. 1936).
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
Interview with Expert D (Oct. 1, 2020).
Id.
Id.
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musicological significance in a copyright lawsuit: “If [the element at
issue] is just a short melody, a short phrase, and I can find it happening
frequently . . . I don’t think it’s worthy of protection. . . . I just think it’s
something that seems to make sense.” 199
Similarly, another interview subject said that the fact that the
author may not have ever encountered the earlier works before “doesn’t
matter.” 200 Their overarching concern was not to let any one claimant
assert exclusivity over too basic a musical building block. Referencing
the recent claim over Led Zeppelin’s guitar introduction to “Stairway to
Heaven,” they asked incredulously whether a plaintiff who was truly
unaware of various earlier works that included similar expression could
now say that “he now owns a broken chord and a chromatic scale? That
doesn’t make any sense to me.” 201
This subject confirmed that it was “absolutely a part” of their job
to assess the originality of an allegedly similar musical element. 202
“Prior art,” they explained, “is an incredibly important part of the job of
determining how original something is.” 203 When asked what they
meant by “originality” in this context, they stressed that “I know that
originality has a very low bar” but that, even so, some musical
expression just isn’t creative enough. 204
One expert went so far as to quantify prior art’s relevance to
substantiality: “We have criteria. We actually weigh it. We basically
have created a scale . . . in essence of one to ten, one being completely
dissimilar and ten being near identical as in a sampling case.” 205 They
added, “we also have a scale of one to ten for originality. And you can
conceivably have something that’s an eight or nine in similarity, but
one or two or nothing in originality.” 206 Scoring that factor, this subject
continued, depended on what already existed in the prior art:
If I find five other songs [that contain the musical element at issue], that kind of weakens
the originality factor . . . . If [that element] is trivial, trite materials that can be found in
countless other places, I would say that . . . it still doesn’t deny that they’re similar, it just
denies the significance of the similar part. 207

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id.
Interview with Expert E (Feb. 8, 2021).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Or, to put a finer point on it, “it doesn’t mean they’re not similar, it just
means the similarity doesn’t matter in a legal proceeding.” 208
There was one subject, however, who offered something of a
dissenting view. Out of concern that a party might manipulate the
substantiality question, they cautioned against using prior art to talk
about a similarity’s importance. They illustrated that concern through
a hypothetical example in which the defendant’s expert identified prior
art containing the same sequence of notes as the pieces at issue—same
rhythm, same pitches—such that only three notes were left between the
two works at issue, one in each measure. The opposing expert would
then argue that the remaining notes were insufficiently original to be
protectable. But that dissective move, the interview subject told us,
would obscure the reality of how the music actually sounds: “Then the
argument was, well look at these notes. These three isolated notes. Are
they protectable? No. Of course not. But those three notes don’t really
exist anywhere . . . they’re a creation of this analysis.” 209
To be sure, we suspect that many musicologists who have
previously worked on a plaintiff’s behalf would be sympathetic. So, for
that matter, would many judges who have expressed wariness over
copyright defendants trying to break a work down into artificially small
pieces. 210 Nevertheless, given how extensively most other experts
engage in some degree of dissection, this interview subject’s aversion to
using prior art in order to talk about substantiality struck us as an
outlier.
3. Experts’ Work Flow
Each expert whom we interviewed described an individual
process of conducting a prior art search, but those processes share some
common features. Broadly speaking, they tended to rely on two sources
the most. First, their own in-house know-how and deep knowledge of

208. Id.
209. Interview with Expert B (Oct. 2, 2020).
210. See, e.g., Enter. Mgmt. Ltd. v. Warrick, 717 F.3d 1112, 1119 (10th Cir. 2013) (“Any
copyrightable work can be sliced into elements unworthy of copyright protection. Books could be
reduced to a collection of non-copyrightable words. . . . Music could be distilled into a series of noncopyrightable rhythmic tones. A painting could be viewed as a composition of unprotectable
colors.”); Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1003 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[I]f we took this
[dissection] argument to its logical conclusion, we might have to decide that there can be no
originality in a painting because all colors of paint have been used somewhere in the past.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Daryl Lim, Saving Substantial Similarity, 73 FLA. L. REV.
591, 602 (2021) (“The problem, however, is that the protectable elements of any work can be
dissected to a point where almost nothing remains but its unprotectable parts, and caselaw
provides little indication of where to stop in the reductionist analysis.”).
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musical repertory; and second, some kind of database or technological
tool.
One expert whose process was generally representative of the
full cohort explained that the tech would only get you so far. The subject
boasted “a very broad musical education myself,” combined with “a
team of people who also have . . . a century’s worth of musical mental
library.” 211 To be sure, they said, “there is some technology that narrows
it down a little bit, but it really takes the musical knowledge of someone
with a vast musical literature background.” 212 They went on to explain
that “part of it’s done through technology, say a lyric search . . . and
then there’s a lot of what you might call on-the-ground searching of
archives.” 213
Another subject told us that they consult multiple resources,
from online search queries to an informal professional network. “Online
databases are very important,” this subject said, “and there are also
some published sources, print sources that I’ve used. And also . . . just
talking to other scholars and musicians who are really schooled
musically, in popular music in particular, has been very fruitful for
me . . . there are people out there who just have encyclopedic
knowledge.” 214 Likewise, a different subject reported “occasional” use of
technological tools, their “own repertoire knowledge,” and “sometimes
consult[ing] anonymously with people, with other musicians I know
who have other repertoire knowledge.” 215 One subject even reported
building their own personal database from scratch: “I transcribe so
much music. I’ve transcribed 50–60,000 pieces. I have a database of
these. . . . And I’ve got over 11,000 CDs, I’ve got a ton of music. So I have
access to a lot.” 216
*

*

*

In sum, our interview data reveals a group of expert witnesses
whose professional self-understanding diverges sharply from the
traditional doctrinal account of what experts are supposed to do in
copyright cases. They view prior art research as a central part of their
job. And for many of them, that research is important not just because
it can help prove whether an accused infringer has actually engaged in
copying, but also because it informs which musical bits and pieces
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Interview with Expert A (Oct. 8, 2020).
Id.
Id.
Interview with Expert B (Oct. 2, 2020).
Interview with Expert C (Sept. 24, 2020).
Interview with Expert D (Oct. 1, 2020).

1202

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:4:1159

deserve legal exclusivity in the first place. Having made the case that
forensic musicologists are driving courts’ doctrinal shift toward prior
art, we turn in the next Part to the questions of how and why these
experts have coalesced around that position.
III. EXPERT COALESCENCE
Learned Hand’s pronouncement that prior art had no major
relevance in copyright held sway universally over the course of the
twentieth century. 217 Yet so far over the course of the twenty-first,
music infringement cases are giving prior art a meaningful—and, to
some judges, indispensable—place in the doctrine. As the previous Part
documented, expert witnesses have been pushing courts toward this
shift.
They probably couldn’t have succeeded in making that push,
however, without sharing certain prior commitments. And indeed we
found that our interview subjects agree on a lot. Terminologically,
several of them personally use the phrase “prior art.” All of them,
whether they use that phrase or not, understand it to mean works that
were known to the public before the creation of one or both of the
parties’ works. 218 They also agree, as discussed in Section II.B.2 above,
that bringing prior art to the court’s attention in the first place is the
defendant’s burden in a litigated dispute. 219
Most fundamentally, they agree on the centrality of prior art to
the expert’s job. 220 For example, one expert told us that prior art “is of
utmost importance, I’d say it’s essential . . . to show whether there is
music out there . . . even if it’s just one piece . . . that was widely
disseminated, . . . for a plaintiff, that would be pretty much the end of
their case.” 221 Another described prior art as “a very important part of
the sort of combined information that’s needed to make an informed
decision about approach or whether or not to walk away entirely.” 222
This shared focus on prior art is similarly borne out in the experts’ work
product. Most of the written reports we reviewed in Section II.A devoted
substantial real estate to analyzing prior art.

217. See supra text accompanying note 37 (discussing Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures
Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936)).
218. See, e.g., Interview with Expert E (Nov. 5, 2020) (using prior art to mean “works publicly
known before the date of both works in question”).
219. See, e.g., Interview with Expert A (Oct. 8, 2020) (“[I]t is not the burden of the plaintiffs to
provide prior art.”).
220. See supra note 182.
221. Interview with Expert B (Oct. 2, 2020).
222. Interview with Expert A (Oct. 8. 2020).
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Here in this final Part, we explore some possible explanations
for how forensic musicologists coalesced around the concept of authorial
prior art, notwithstanding decades of case law sweeping in the opposite
direction. Part of the answer may lie in the social processes through
which these musicologists build expertise and in turn project it to
others. Another may have to do with their individual economic
incentives. Though it’s beyond our scope here to prove the causal link,
we at least suspect that both sociological and economic factors are at
work, which we describe below.
A. A Community of Experts
As a group, forensic musicologists share two salient
characteristics: First, they have a deep, technical knowledge base.
These experts sit at the intersection of two specialized fields,
musicology and copyright law. Though they are not typically trained in
law directly, forensic musicologists often work closely with lawyers to
tailor their knowledge to the complicated and quirky world of copyright
litigation.
Second, there aren’t many of them. The American Musicology
Society, a leading scholarly organization in the field, lists a total of
thirty-five individuals who self-report a specialization in forensic
musicology. 223 While it’s possible that many of these people are active
in a nontestifying capacity as consultants, our review of the last few
decades of music copyright judicial decisions suggests a more
conservative count of around six names that regularly appear in
litigation. In other words, forensic musicology is a very small and very
exclusive club. The select few in it understand the confluence of two
niche subject areas, musicology and copyright law, that most others do
not. Indeed, even within the broader field of musicology, the
methodology of forensic musicologists is something of a world unto
itself. 224
That this group is both deeply knowledgeable and also small is
probably related. There simply aren’t many people who can do what
223. Forensic
Musicology,
AM.
MUSICOLOGICAL
SOC’Y,
https://www.amsmusicology.org/page/ForensicMusicology
(last
visited
Mar.
9,
2022)
[https://perma.cc/A5NU-5989].
224. See Robert Fink, Blurred Lines, Ur-Lines, and Color Lines, AMS MUSICOLOGY NOW (Mar.
15,
2015),
https://musicologynow.org/blurred-lines-ur-lines-and-color-lines/
[https://perma.cc/4MPN-JTZ5] (describing, from the perspective of a university musicology
professor, the difference between academic musicology’s more abstract “conceptual modes of
thinking” and forensic musicology’s necessarily “clear lines” and “ ‘just the facts ma’am’
phenomenology of music, stubbornly shallow and literalist, yes, but also free from . . . the hidden
ideological claptrap of musicological training” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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forensic musicologists do, and the training involved in acquiring the
expertise is significant. 225 With such an intimate size, one might think
the members of this profession would be in regular communication. We
initially hypothesized that they probably had some outlet for face-toface knowledge-sharing. 226 Perhaps, we conjectured, these experts had
cultivated shared norms and expectations while socializing and
working alongside each other.
Yet every expert with whom we spoke could think of no such
networking outlet: no formal professional organization, no annual
conference, no series of happy hours or meet-ups. At most, one said,
there might be an informal lunch here or there with an individual
colleague. 227 Beyond that, however, their most extensive interaction
comes only as opposing experts during litigation. 228 In other words, the
experts we spoke with do not describe themselves as inhabiting a
conventional community of practice whose members cluster within the
same institutions and maintain regular social interactions.
Nevertheless, even absent those channels, forensic musicologists
have evidently still developed their own norms around prior art’s value.
While we can’t say for sure, it’s possible that this process of norm
generation is occurring through reading each other’s works instead of
through in-person socialization. Our interview subjects all described
reading their peers’ reports, when publicly available, as well as judicial
opinions in other music infringement cases in which they were not
personally engaged. For example, one told us that they “try to keep
abreast of cases that are current, and when possible, I like to look at
other musicologists’ reports. . . . I also look at amicus briefs that are
filed. I try to keep up with that.” 229 Another said, “It’s only a handful of
people who do this, and we all know who each other are, because we
read each other’s reports, often in opposition.” 230 These reports seem to
function as a sort of literature within the field. And by repeatedly
225. When asked how long they had been in practice, for example, one expert we spoke with
told us they had been honing their craft for “more than twenty-five years”; another said they began
“about twenty-five plus years ago.” Interviews with Experts E (Nov. 5, 2020), A (Oct. 8, 2020). A
third told us, “I’ve been a professional musician since I was twelve . . . [and] working as an expert
witness since 1993.” Interview with Expert D (Oct. 1, 2020).
226. Such communities of practice are common in specialized fields. See, e.g., Laura G.
Pedraza-Fariña, Patent Law and the Sociology of Innovation, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 813, 839
(summarizing findings from the sociology of scientific expertise, in which individual experts
inhabit social worlds that are “defined by a core set of activities: accepted practices, techniques,
legitimate research goals, training procedures, and relationships among a cluster of
practitioners”).
227. Interview with Expert A (Feb. 18, 2021).
228. Id.
229. Interview with Expert B (Feb. 11, 2021).
230. Interview with Expert C (Feb. 11, 2021).
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exposing its readers to the same prior-art-driven techniques, that
literature may be contributing to the interview subjects’ commitment to
the concept.
B. The Market for Experts
Alongside sociological explanations, there’s probably some level
of individual economic incentives pushing experts toward prior art as
well. The recent proliferation of high-profile infringement cases and
record-setting jury verdicts has raised the visibility of music copyright
infringement litigation. 231 This publicity, in turn, has elevated the
status and importance of the expert witness, who is so often crucial to
the outcome. 232 At the same time, the field is becoming busier. 233 As one
entertainment lawyer told Rolling Stone in 2018: “Since the ‘Blurred
Lines’ case, there has been an increase in calls to lawyers from clients
along the lines of, ‘This sounds a little like this [other song]. What do
you think?’ . . . This has certainly increased the workload for working
musicologists.” 234
The increased demand for forensic musicologist services has not,
however, been met with much new supply in the labor force. As our
survey of expert reports in litigated cases confirmed, expert
engagements tend to go to the same few individuals again and again. A
musicologist looking to become, or remain, a repeat player would be well
served to model the practices of successful experts in the field.
One such practice is the prior art search. Courts didn’t used to
consider these searches to be an indispensable part of music
infringement cases, but experts are now successfully convincing the
courts that they should be. 235 If these arguments continue to succeed in
court, we should expect experts to keep making them. That’s especially

231. See ECONOMIST, supra note 130 (reporting that “[b]etween 1844 and 2014 no more than
eight [music copyright] cases a year were heard in American federal courts,” while “[t]he past six
years have seen an average of 16”); Wang, supra note 13.
232. Andy Hermann, Beyond ‘Blurred Lines’: How Forensic Musicology Is Altering Pop’s
STONE
(Apr.
4,
2018,
5:13
PM),
Future,
ROLLING
https://www.rollingstone.com/pro/features/beyond-blurred-lines-how-forensic-musicology-isaltering-pops-future-204986/ [https://perma.cc/X6F7-9CYJ] (noting that “the testimony of a savvy
forensic musicologist can influence a jury in unpredictable ways”).
233. See id. (quoting a longtime forensic musicologist’s comment that, since the Blurred Lines
litigation, “The last two years have been my busiest years ever.”); ECONOMIST, supra note 130
(referencing a different forensic musicologist also saying that “he is doing more such work since
‘Blurred Lines’ ”).
234. Hermann, supra note 232.
235. See supra Section II.A.2. We found that Lawrence Ferrara, the expert who has appeared
most frequently for defendants, has raised prior art in over forty-five separate cases over the last
two decades.
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true in the case of forensic experts, whose only marketplace lies in
actual or threatened legal proceedings and so aren’t limited by any
external definition of reliable methods. 236
From a judge’s perspective, there are a number of reasons why
prior art arguments could look attractive. Chief among them is the
potential for a shortcut to dismiss clearly unmeritorious cases.
Plaintiffs are filing many music infringement claims these days, 237
some of which aren’t even colorable. 238 Given how much uncertainty
surrounds the substantial similarity inquiry as a general matter, prior
art might be used as a sorting mechanism to cull out the obviously
losing claims.
For example, one of our interview subjects told us that
prospective clients often come to them “convinced that their unreleased
demo has been copied by a major pop star . . . and they believe
incorrectly that their own work was original. . . . I spend a lot of my time
talking down clients I don’t really want to take on.” 239 Another subject
spoke of filtering out prospective cases even before a formal prior art
search is conducted, based simply upon their knowledge of musical
repertory. Despite similarities between the parties’ works, they
recommended against conducting a prior art search in such cases
“because it can be very time-consuming, and it’s expensive, and I don’t
think what you have here is going to amount to a strong case. . . . I don’t
recommend doing it.” 240
Another reason we may find courts today more amenable to prior
art in copyright is its usefulness to juries. All cases of nonliteral copying
implicate the question of whether or not the copied elements are
significant. In music cases, the answer often isn’t self evident. 241 One
could build an answer on the basis of music theory, but no jury has time
to learn that theory from scratch in the courtroom. Prior art might offer
236. See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Scripting Expertise: The History of Handwriting Identification
Evidence and the Judicial Construction of Reliability, 87 VA. L. REV. 1723, 1728–29 (2001)
(observing that because forensic experts operate exclusively within legal proceedings, the lack of
any exogenous definition of scientific validity encourages them to “shape their testimony explicitly
to comport with judicial ideas about what is persuasive”).
237. See Wang, supra note 13.
238. See, e.g., Porter Wells, Pushing ‘Meritless’ Migos Infringement Suit Draws Sanctions,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 27, 2020, 12:08 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/pushing-meritlessmigos-infringement-suit-draws-sanctions [https://perma.cc/CJT5-639Q] (quoting a magistrate
judge’s conclusion that a plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim was “objectively unreasonable”).
239. Interview with Expert C (Sept. 24, 2020).
240. Interview with Expert B (Oct. 2, 2020).
241. See Gene Maddaus, Bright Lines: Musicologists Police the Boundaries of Copyright Law,
VARIETY (Dec. 4, 2019), https://variety.com/2019/music/news/forensic-musicologists-copyright-lawkaty-perry-blurred-lines-1203423422/ [https://perma.cc/7HYR-BZH6] (quoting one forensic
musicologist’s observation that “it’s often very difficult for the average person to understand some
of the nuances and technical aspects of the music presented at trial”).
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befuddled jurors a concrete reference point that they could latch onto
more easily than they could abstract principles of theory.
Finally, emphasizing prior art increases the experts’ own value
as a litigation resource. Conducting a prior art search is not something
many people—certainly not many lawyers—can do. The more central
these searches are in music infringement litigation, the more
indispensable the experts become to the proceeding. By centering prior
art in the analysis, then, experts may create some additional demand
for their services. 242
CONCLUSION
Our findings suggest several lessons for modern copyright
practice. An immediate one is tactical: more often than it’s typically
given credit for, prior art can win or lose some copyright infringement
cases. For now, those cases are virtually all centered on music. Perhaps
it will stay that way. If it does, it wouldn’t be the first time that judges
have crafted copyright rules that seem to operate differently for music
than for other subject matter. 243 Or perhaps judges’ receptiveness to
prior art arguments will eventually migrate to cases involving other
kinds of subject matter as well. 244 We don’t offer a prediction here. But
at least in the music cases where this shift is already underway, lawyers
should be paying attention. Defense attorneys are leaving something on
the table if they don’t make an available argument that an alleged
similarity carries less weight in light of overlapping earlier works. On
the other side, plaintiff’s attorneys are taking an underappreciated risk
if they attack the legal premise of such arguments rather than trying
to rebut it on the facts. 245
But we think that there’s a more systemic lesson here as well.
Forensic musicologists’ elevation of prior art as a copyright concept is a
case study in how judges can refine their regulation of creative fields by
listening to the specialists who know those fields best. As discussed
242. There is some resonance here with the history of handwriting experts, the first forensic
experts in the history of U.S. litigation, who framed their work as both scientific inquiry and juror
education in order to make judges value it more. See Mnookin, supra note 236, at 1828.
243. See Fishman, supra note 24, at 913 (describing copyright doctrine’s idiosyncratically high
originality threshold for musical arrangements); Joseph P. Fishman, Music as a Matter of Law,
131 HARV. L. REV. 1861, 1893–94 (2018) (showing that copyright’s infringement analysis
historically treated music differently than it did other subject matter by focusing only on a single
expressive element, melody, rather than on multiple elements).
244. The Second Circuit’s decision in Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), for
example, was factually about music but ended up establishing the analytical framework for every
future claim of infringing similarity through the present day.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 171–177 (discussing the failure of this strategy for the
plaintiff in Bowen v. Paisley).
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above, copyright doctrine famously minimizes expert witnesses’ role in
the infringement analysis. 246 It instructs that the lay observer, not the
specialist, must be the one to answer whether a copyist has taken too
much. That approach has received some withering criticism from
scholars, who have argued that fact finders need a specialist’s
perspective to understand which of a work’s elements actually qualify
as protectable expression. 247
Music cases, however, have proven complex enough that courts
have set them alongside software as rarified places where experts
actually get to weigh in. And now that those experts been invited to
speak, our findings here reveal what they’re actually saying: prior art
affects an alleged similarity’s significance. That message is
simultaneously in deep tension with close to a century’s worth of
copyright jurisprudence and yet also perfectly persuasive to many
judges today.
These judges are learning something that their predecessors on
the bench never had a chance to hear. Forensic musicologists’
perspective seems to be affecting not just the courts’ view of the facts in
discrete cases, but more fundamentally the legal standard that is to be
applied across cases. Of course, musicologists will disagree in individual
disputes just as expert witnesses do in every area of law. But when they
agree on basic principles, as they increasingly have begun to in the
context of prior art, courts ought to pay attention.
The courts that have been paying that attention may be finding
an analytical tool they increasingly need to use. As plaintiffs file more
of these music infringement claims, particularly involving the short

246. See supra text accompanying note 104.
247. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 104, at 739 (“Without the benefit of expert testimony and
the ability to dissect the work, judges and juries are more likely to find infringement in dubious
circumstances, because they aren’t properly educated on the difference between protectable and
unprotectable elements.”); Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual
Property Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1288–89 (2014) (arguing that copyright should
welcome more expert testimony on infringement questions because experts can better identify
whether a copied element was something standard within the genre or whether the defendant’s
work had made a material artistic contribution); Pamela Samuelson, A Fresh Look at Tests for
Nonliteral Copyright Infringement, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1821, 1844 (2013) (arguing that “experts
may be helpful in a wide range of cases” even beyond software “on issues such as the range of
expressive alternatives, design features that have become standard in an industry, respects in
which the work at issue is distinguishable from similar works, [and] the degree of its originality”);
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Questionable Origins of the Copyright Infringement Analysis, 68
STAN. L. REV. 791, 859 (2016) (proposing a new infringement framework that “would require (and
allow for) the introduction of expert testimony and for the judge to engage in an analytical
dissection of the works in comparing them,” where “[s]uch testimony and dissection would guide
the judge’s development of the appropriate normative criteria for cognizability by ensuring that it
comports with accepted practices and norms within an area of creativity”).
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snippets that seem to be occupying so much of the recent case law, 248
judges may find the concept of prior art to be a handy way to view a
compositional choice in its full creative context. What’s more, to the
extent that the tool allows judges to resolve more cases on summary
judgment, it also facilitates the emergence of an actual jurisprudence
on acceptable versus unacceptable copying. Rather than leaving all
such value judgments to the mysteries of the jury, prior art may help
judges begin to articulate principles that, over time, could provide more
clarity to future creators who’d like to figure out what’s permissible. 249
Only weeks before this Article’s publication, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the lower court’s decision to vacate a jury’s infringement verdict against
Katy Perry. 250 The appeals court declared that “even when juries serve
as factfinders, judges retain an important gatekeeping role in applying
the law.” 251 Allowing prior art into the adjudication helps judges fulfill
that role.
Though the experts whom we studied are playing a significant
role in shifting judges’ practice on this issue, in our view they’re not
overstepping their bounds. It’s well established that before any fact
finder can evaluate the similarity between the parties’ works, “the court
must filter out the unprotectable elements of the plaintiff’s work.” 252
The prior art that experts are now pushing to the foreground supplies
the factual predicate for courts to perform that filtration. Experts are
providing information that helps courts fulfill their proper gatekeeping
role of determining which elements of a work are protectable in the first
place.
To be sure, we’re not naive enough to think that increasing the
amount of expert testimony will always lead to more satisfying case
outcomes. 253 But we think it’s at least important to know when the
subject-matter specialists can agree on first principles, however much
they might disagree on how to apply those principles to a given set of
facts. Our system for adjudicating copyright infringement would be
248. See supra text accompanying note 114 (noting frequency of claims over short fragments
of musical works).
249. See Balganesh, supra note 247, at 797 (“[D]iscouraging summary judgment on the
[similarity] question in an effort to have juries make the determination has prevented copyright
jurisprudence from developing a coherent set of rules and principles that might guide the
decision, thereby producing a body of decisions that appears inextricably ad hoc and arbitrary.”).
250. Gray v. Hudson 28 F.4th 87 (9th Cir. 2022); see also supra text accompanying note 111
(discussing the lower court’s decision).
251. Gray, 28 F.4th at 96–97.
252. Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
253. On the contrary, one of us has previously criticized experts’ role in the ballooning
complexity and resulting unpredictability of music infringement cases. See Fishman, supra note
99, at 668–70.
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better off if we gave courts more room—across all subject matter—to
find out where such areas of agreement exist.

